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DOMESTIC TERRORISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

*Threat of violence from Aboriginal, Left Wing (LWE) and Right
Wing extremists (RWE)*

Canada

PRO
ET

2018-09-21

3103(18/09)

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DOMESTIC TERRORISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

OVERVIEW

Review period - 2013 08 01 to 2015 07 31

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DOMESTIC TERRORISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

ABORIGINAL EXTREMISM

- Background
- Threat of Serious Violence

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DOMESTIC TERRORISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

LEFT WING EXTREMISM

- Background
- Threat of Serious Violence

DOMESTIC TERRORISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

RIGHT WING EXTREMISM

- Background
- Threat of Serious Violence

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2018-09-21

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DOMESTIC EXTREMISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

HQ AEA COMMENTS/CONCERNS

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DOMESTIC EXTREMISM PROGRAM EVALUATION

RECOMMENDATIONS / OPTIONS

Domestic extremism program evaluation

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Date: November 9, 2011
Classification: Unclassified
Agency: CSIS

Committee Note
TERRORISM

ISSUE: What is the domestic environment for terrorism in Canada? What is being done about radicalization in Canada? How does the international context relate to what is happening in Canada? How many Canadians abroad are engaged in terrorist activity? How many returnees? How is CSIS countering the terrorism and extremist threat?

- The primary terrorist threat to Canadians remains extremists who are motivated to carry out deadly attacks in our communities.
- Conflicts abroad, particularly those in Iraq and Syria, continue to inspire individuals, whether to support broader movements directly, or attempt to attack Canadians at home.
- Radicalized individuals in Canada have planned attacks, sent money and supplies to violent extremist groups abroad, and sought to recruit members of their communities, particularly youth.
- Canadians have been used by extremist groups in suicide missions, as recently as March 2017, when a Daesh recruit, Abu-Mahika al-Kanadi, conducted a suicide bombing against Iraqi Forces in Mosul, Iraq.
- The threat environment is very fluid, and there are many "unknowns" for which we have to account. As recent incidents make clear – terrorist violence can be perpetrated with little warning and even the family car can become a weapon.
- We must, therefore, work closely with our partners to increase our situational awareness of potential threats and better assess which of those threats are the most critical. We consistently rely upon the vigilance and cooperation of Canadians.
- In terms of how CSIS prioritizes its investigative activity, we leverage all available expertise and resources to ensure that the most immediate and pressing public safety threats are addressed.
- For example, an individual who provides direct support to a terrorist group may be of greater concern than an individual who appears to sympathize with that group's ideology.

ON THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

- The terrorist threat level in Canada remains at **MEDIUM**, meaning that there is sufficient credible information that a violent act of terrorism could occur.
- The main terrorist threat to Canada continues to stem from violent extremists inspired by terrorist groups, such as Daesh and al-Qaida.
- Terrorists are adopting low-tech, low-cost means of committing high impact violent acts, such as using knives or vehicles to inflict harm.
- For example, on September 30, 2017, a police officer in Edmonton was struck by a vehicle and stabbed multiple times by the driver. The assailant then fled on foot and drove a U-Haul truck into multiple bystanders, injuring four people.
- The internet has played an enabling role in spreading propaganda and inciting attacks by allowing groups to cultivate a culture of fear, hatred and mistrust.
- Right-wing extremism is also a growing concern in Canada, and individuals who hold these views are very active online.
- Hate-related incidents reported to police in Canada have increased, and CSIS will investigate individuals who hold extreme right wing views and who are willing to engage in politically motivated violence.
- The potential for online hate to evolve into serious acts of politically-motivated violence is a reality to which we remain vigilant.

ON RADICALIZATION

- The narrative that the West is at war with Islam continues to exert a powerful influence in radicalization both in our communities and online.

- In Canada, a small number of individuals continue to be radicalized and mobilized to violence, and may attempt to further their causes through violent means.
- The Service has unique insight into the small number of Canadians who embrace terrorism, and CSIS continues to work with partners to better understand radicalization as it develops into violence in the Canadian context.

ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

- The threat to Canada and its allies posed by Daesh is international in scope.
- Daesh has carried out attacks in France, Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Turkey has also experienced an increase in Daesh-linked attacks, including a shooting at a night club in Istanbul in January 2017, in which a Canadian was killed.
- In recent years, Daesh has lost significant territory in both Syria and Iraq, and suffered heavy casualties from coalition airstrikes. In July 2017, Iraqi forces proclaimed victory in retaking Mosul.
- However, getting rid of Daesh's physical presence in the Middle East via military means does not entirely eliminate the threat of their violent ideology.
- Since Iraqi forces retook Mosul, members of Daesh have dispersed, making coverage on Canadians extremists more challenging.
- Daesh is expected to evolve and re-form in the wider jihadist community. Daesh's expansion in Africa, as well as South and Southeast Asia, continues to shape the threat environments of these regions.
- As such, a global reach is an absolute necessity in CSIS' efforts to investigate and respond to threats posed by Daesh to Canada and its partners.

ON TERRORIST TRAVEL

- Canadians have been implicated in terrorism activities in several countries, including Syria, Iraq, and Algeria.
- While Canadian extremists have travelled in the past to support terror groups in many countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia), Syria and Iraq currently maintain the highest concentration of Canadian extremists.
- There remain approximately 180 individuals with a Canadian nexus who have left Canada in support of terrorist activities.
- The majority of these individuals travelled to Syria and Iraq prior to 2016, with very few having left for the conflict zone after 2016.
- Travellers may participate in a range of activities depending on their abilities and contacts, including paramilitary training, suicide missions, logistical and financial support, even translation and propaganda.

ON NUMBERS ABROAD

- The roughly 180 Canadians abroad have been implicated in terrorism activities in several countries, including Syria, Iraq, and Algeria.
- While Canadian extremists have travelled in the past to support terror groups in many countries like Afghanistan and Somalia, Syria and Iraq currently maintain the highest concentration of Canadian extremists.
- Given the significant operational challenges associated with counter terrorism investigations of Canadians abroad, CSIS continues to be concerned about the number of individuals that we are not aware of, and those for whom we have incomplete information.

ON RETURNEES

- The number of people returning from the Syrian conflict zone remains low, which can be attributed to Daesh's tight control and intense scrutiny over their recruits for potential desertion.
- The Service is currently aware of approximately 60 people who have returned to Canada after having travelled overseas in support of

terrorism.

- Returnees have responded to their life in Canada in a variety of ways. While some return to regular life, others have become key contacts for radicalization, terrorist travel or financing, both online and in their communities.
- CSIS maintains situational awareness to determine whether returnees may pose a potential threat and advise government accordingly.
- In terms of the response, there are a range of options to consider, often in consultation with implicated departments and agencies.
- We work very closely with partners, in particular the RCMP, to inform criminal investigations or enforcement action (arrests and prosecutions) as appropriate.
- The Service may make the decision to share critical information to inform other types of enforcement action, such as citizenship and immigration decisions, as well as the prevention of travel in support of violent extremism.

ON THE PUBLIC THREAT REPORT

- CSIS contributes to The Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada at several stages in the process, and welcomes the opportunity for transparency on non-operational topics that are also intrinsic to the national security landscape in Canada.
- CSIS appreciates the role of public reports in informing Canadians on threats to the security of Canada, and building an understanding of global terrorism.

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Violent Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

BUT

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Violent Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

Collaboration with

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Review of CSIS's Investigation into Right-Wing Extremism

(SIRC STUDY 2017-03)

WORK PLAN

1.1 Background

SIRC last examined right-wing extremism in its review of CSIS activities related to Domestic Issues and Emerging Threats in 2012. SIRC found that CSIS had run successful, human-source-rich investigations into domestic threat-related activities associated with Aboriginal extremism, the white supremacist movement, Quebec sovereignty and "multi-issue extremism" (MIE). At that time, CSIS had recently approved a single-based issue certificate on In December 2015, the Director approved downgrading all CSIS domestic investigations.

The killing in early 2017 of six Muslims at a mosque in Quebec City has raised such questions regarding CSIS's investigation into extremist behaviour that is not associated with Islamist extremism. This review will examine CSIS's activities with respect to right-wing extremism investigations since 2011 as well as examine the impact, if any, of the January 2017 killings on CSIS's investigative focus in relation to

1.2 Objective and Research Methodology

1.2.1 Objectives

This review has several objectives:

- examining how CSIS is investigating right-wing extremism since SIRC last looked at aspects of this investigation in 2012, including the range of activities taking place under the authority
- providing a broad overview of CSIS's approach to investigating right wing extremism, including some key metrics of the investigation until December 2015, when the investigation was downgraded

File No.:

April 19, 2017

Page 2 of 3

- identifying intelligence gaps and/or challenges unique to right wing extremism and identifying and assessing how CSIS is attempting to mitigate or manage those challenges (including how it liaises with law enforcement), especially in the period following the attack in Quebec City.

Further to this, SIRC will examine relevant policies and procedures and review the investigation in order to ensure compliance with the CSIS Act, ministerial direction, and policies and procedures.

1.2.2 Research Methodology

The methodology for this review will consist of a review of all associated operational files, briefings with CSIS officials and a review of corporate documents. The review will also contain a regional component as there will be a visit to at least one Region.

1.3 Scope of Review

The core review period for this study will be January 1, 2012, to the present, although information will be requested from outside this period when deemed relevant.

1.4 Preliminary Materials

SIRC will consult the following documentation, among others, and will request CSIS assistance, as necessary:

- all Directional Statements related to any aspect of CSIS's investigation of right-wing extremism
- all human sources files for those reporting on any aspect of this investigation
- all operational files related to any aspect of this investigation
- all Intelligence Assessments related to any aspect of this investigation
- all CSIS internal correspondence or planning documents, including emails, briefing notes, or executive level documents in which any aspect of this investigation is discussed or referenced

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1.5 Preliminary Briefing

SIRC requests a preliminary briefing as soon as possible upon receipt of this work plan. The briefing should address, to the extent possible, how the investigation has evolved over the period under review, the circumstances that led it to be downgraded to attack in Quebec. and the state of thinking now, following the

1.6 Review Period

Activity	Date
Work plan to CSIS	April 2017
Preliminary briefing	May 2017
Regional visit(s)	May 2017
Document review and additional briefings	May 2017- July 2017
Draft Report to SIRC Management	September 2017
Presentation to Committee Members	October 2017

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THREAT HIGHLIGHT



Canadian Security Intelligence Service


ITAC CIET Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

TH 17/21 / 2017-02-14

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UPDATE: Quebec City mosque shooting

TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR **CANADA** remains at **MEDIUM**



Canadian Alexandre Bissonnette, a Quebec resident and University of Laval student, was responsible for carrying out a small-arms attack at the Grande mosque de Québec on 2017 01 29. According to media reporting on 2017 02 06, the RCMP described Bissonnette as a "criminal extremist". Bissonnette was charged with six counts of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder using a restricted firearm.

ITAC has received additional information that updates its initial assessment on 2017 01 30 (TH 17/12 Revised). According to media reporting, Bissonnette called 911 after the attack to turn himself in.

Right-wing extremism in Canada



Source: Canadian Press

Canadian research published in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* in February 2016 found evidence that right-wing extremist groups are active in Canada, with concentrations in Quebec, western Ontario, Alberta and the lower mainland of British Columbia.

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ASSESSMENT NOTE
This assessment is based on

open sources

DEFINITIONS and HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS are located at the last page.

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CANADA

MEDIUM ←

ITAC

assesses that a violent act of terrorism in Canada could occur.

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

	Threat levels: raised lowered remains
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY .
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY .

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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Security Intelligence
Review Committee



Office of the Chairman

ADP

Comité de surveillance des activités
de renseignement de sécurité

Bureau du président

TOP SECRET//CEO

File No.: 2800-222

November 29, 2017

CSIS / SCRS

The Honourable Ralph Goodale, P.C.
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
269 Laurier Avenue West
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0P8

DEC 06 2017

27141

DIR

Dear Mr. Goodale,

Re: Review of CSIS Investigation of Right-Wing Extremism (SIRC Study 2017-03)

This letter provides you with the results of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) investigation of right-wing extremism (RWE). **Annex A** provides background information.

Overall, SIRC found that CSIS activities conducted during the period of January 1, 2012, to June 30, 2017, complied with the CSIS Act and ministerial direction on intelligence priorities. CSIS activities were also consistent with the authorities and limitations set out in its targeting policy.

CSIS demonstrated that partnerships with police and law enforcement agencies were important.

Besides helping to maintain awareness, these tools were valuable in investigating RWE activities that may present a threat to the security of Canada, including, for example, hate crime against Muslims.

In the Québec Region, CSIS participation in the Structure de gestion policière contre le terrorisme in the past five years, and CSIS's relationships and effective information exchanges with domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies helped CSIS eliminate gaps in its investigation of RWE threats. **SIRC recommends that CSIS determine the extent to which other regions' investigation of RWE could benefit from the experience and CSIS-law enforcement collaborative model in place in the Québec Region.**

TOP SECRET//CEO

SIRC examined in detail CSIS reporting on RWE following the January 2017 attack at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City and had no outstanding questions.

CSIS continues to assess the best means to engage investigative resources against RWE, as required, taking into consideration the limitations relating to lawful protest, advocacy and dissent; the high degree of police coverage of RWE threats in some jurisdictions; and the likelihood that the threat or use of violence will originate with one actor and be unplanned.

In the near term, CSIS anticipates that its investigation of RWE threats will be focused on

SIRC has no outstanding questions about CSIS's investigative posture relating to the investigation of RWE.

SIRC takes note of recent events outside of the period under review — for example, in Charlottesville, Virginia, in a number of European cities, and in Halifax, Nova Scotia — that show the potential threat of violent and non-violent RWE and highlight differences in respective national laws on free speech and on hate speech. SIRC will monitor how CSIS's investigation of RWE responds to any changes in the level of this threat in Canada. SIRC plans to revisit this subject in the medium-term.

We would be pleased to discuss the Committee's conclusions and recommendation with you.

Sincerely,

Pierre Blais

Pierre Blais, P.C.
Chair

✓ c.c.: David Vigneault, Director of CSIS

Background

SIRC reviewed CSIS activities conducted during the period of January 1, 2012, to June 30, 2017.

SIRC followed up on in its 2013 review of CSIS investigations into domestic threat-related activities relating to Aboriginal extremism, the white supremacist movement, Québec sovereignty and "multi-issue extremism" (report 2012-02), this time concentrating only on the white supremacist movement.

SIRC examined all CSIS records relating to RWE during the period under review), many of which consisted of

To assess relevant issues completely, SIRC examined other records that fell outside the period under review.

CSIS describes RWE in Canada as a movement that includes a range of groups and individuals espousing a number of issues and grievances, including those related to: racism, including white supremacy, white nationalism and "white religion"; anti-Semitism, nativism, and anti-immigration, anti-government and anti-law enforcement; and homophobia.

In recent years, CSIS's investigative efforts were driven mainly by specific national and international incidents that were affiliated to RWE (i.e., Brevik, Québec Mosque).

According to CSIS, incidents of violent RWE in Canada are infrequent, generally unplanned and opportunistic, and carried out by individuals rather than groups.

In recent years, CSIS has dedicated resources to the investigation of RWE.

A subset of RWE groups promote hate online

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CSIS investigates RWE threats to the security of Canada under paragraphs 2(a) and 2(c) of section 12 of the CSIS Act relating to: espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage (paragraph 2(a)); and/or, relating to activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state (paragraph (2)(c)). Ministerial direction issued since 2012 did not mention RWE until the latest one issued in April 2017.

SIRC verified that CSIS's reporting was compliant with its Procedures on Targeting as appropriate. SIRC had access to all documents relating to the investigations. SIRC held briefings and questioned CSIS employees at Headquarters and in QR involved in RWE investigations, including employees

For most of the period under review (from January 2012 to March 2016), CSIS investigated RWE

In 2014, CSIS determined that the Internet activity of Canadian extremist groups, including activities associated with RWE,

In 2015, an internal CSIS review of its Program contained three principal findings relating to its investigation of RWE. First, a majority of RWE activities consisted of or were "near to" lawful protest, advocacy and dissent. The risk of a CSIS investigation examining such lawful activities was assessed as high. Second, the public order (versus the national security) threat was being appropriately addressed by police and law enforcement. Lastly, because of the first two findings, CSIS questioned the value added of its efforts.

TOP SECRET//CEO

In January 2016, CSIS concluded that the extent and nature of the threat no longer met the threshold for an investigation.

In March 2016, CSIS ended its investigation of RWE.

Then, in January 2017 — following an attack by a lone gunman at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City that killed six and injured 19 others — CSIS's investigation of RWE was reopened

CSIS reopened the investigation in part because of government and partner interest in more information on RWE threats following the attack. Consistent with its mandate and authorities, CSIS has had frequent and comprehensive exchanges with police and law enforcement partners in order to assess intelligence and to better ascertain the threat posed by RWE.

Interviews with CSIS employees at headquarters and in QR demonstrated the value of CSIS's relationships and information exchanges with police and law enforcement agencies to the investigation of RWE.

For example, in the past five years, CSIS was invited to participate in the Structure de gestion policière contre le terrorisme, which comprises the Sureté du Québec (SQ), the Service de police de la Ville de Montréal and the RCMP ("C" Division). The SQ investigates RWE in the province,

Most recently, CSIS HQ gave direction to regions and international stations in April 2017

The regions were directed to maintain open lines of communication with local police and law enforcement agencies

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From:

Sent:

28-Apr-17 9:35 AM

To:

Subject:

FW: (SIRC Study 2017-03) Review of CSIS's
Investigation into Right-Wing Extremism

Attachments:

Right-Wing Extremism workplan.docx

Classification: Secret

Classification: Secret

Not for PA / Ne pas classer

FYI.

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From:

Sent: 28-Apr-17 9:13 AM

To:

Cc:

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Subject: FW: (SIRC Study 2017-03) Review of CSIS's Investigation into Right-Wing Extremism

Classification: Secret

Classification: Secret

Not for PA / Ne pas classer

Thanks.

From:

Sent: 28-Apr-17 8:10 AM

To:

Subject: FW: (SIRC Study 2017-03) Review of CSIS's Investigation into Right-Wing Extremism

Classification: Secret

Classification: Secret

Not for PA / Ne pas classer

Good morning,

briefing.
the division.

(Chief Management Services) will be the point of contact for

will attend the preliminary

Thank you,

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From:

Sent: 25-Apr-17 11:32 AM

To:

Cc:

Subject: (SIRC Study 2017-03) Review of CSIS's Investigation into Right-Wing
Extremism

Classification: Secret

Classification: Secret

Not for PA / Ne pas classer

****DD: COB 2017 04 28****

DG I

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Further to my email of 2017 04 06 in which I provided you with a copy of SIRC's Research Plan for 2017-2018, SIRC Review of CSIS's Investigation into Right-Wing Extremism has now started.

You can find additional details in the attached proposed work plan. The next step will be to arrange a preliminary high-level briefing for SIRC Researchers with CSIS HQ to discuss how the investigation has evolved over the period under review (2012 01 01 to present).

For the initial briefing, I would ask that you nominate someone (preferably Chief or above) to participate. If you think it is appropriate, more than one individual can participate in the initial briefing. We have found that these initial briefings are useful for providing SIRC with the right context and direction for the review. We plan to schedule this initial briefing with the next two weeks.

I would also ask that you designate a Point of Contact with your branch for this review; please indicate if your management services section (where relevant) should be included on all correspondence if it is not the PoC. My staff will be following up shortly with the designated PoC to facilitate documentation access and retrieval.

DG,

For your general awareness only at this time – we anticipate that we will need to request documents from and possibly discuss the investigation further with

one of your senior analysts. We would appreciate if you could please identify a Point of Contact within for this purpose.

will be the primary point of contact in should you have any questions or comments on this review. You are also free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Regards,

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

ITAC

CIET

Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

TA 17/75-E // 2017-06-19

THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

VERY LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur.

1. This threat assessment updates the Canadian National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) last published on 2017 01

18 - ITAC 1705-E

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ASSESSMENT NOTE
This assessment is based on all-source information.

DEFINITIONS and HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS are located on the last page.

TA 17/75-E

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Terrorism Threat Levels for Canada

Canada **VIROUJH** ←→

ITAC

assesses that a violent act of terrorism in Canada could occur.

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**ATTACK ON THE GRANDE
MOSQUÉE DE QUÉBEC**



Source : www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-city-mosque-alexandre.pdf

On 2017 01 29 Laval University student and Quebec City resident, Alexandre Bissonnette, entered the Grande Mosquée de Québec and opened fire on individuals attending prayers, killing 6 and wounding 19.

The full scope of Bissonnette's personal and/or political motive is not entirely clear, apart from his stated hatred of Muslims. Open information indicates that he holds views consistent with extreme right-wing ideology, e.g. anti-Muslim, anti-feminist, white nationalist.

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Methods

9. **Global Campaigns for Inspired, Domestic Attacks Continue:** Sunni extremist propaganda continues to call on Western-based supporters to 'become martyrs' and to conduct attacks in their homelands. DAESH continues to invest in its multilingual multi-platform campaign in an effort to grow its global support base, and similarly AQ is reinvigorating its own external communications efforts (See text box entitled AQ's 'Prince of Terror' on this page). In addition to traditional hard targets, supporters are encouraged to attack local, public spaces using readily available weapons, as seen in the June 2017 London Bridge and Borough Market attack in the UK. On 2017 06 06,

AQ'S 'PRINCE OF TERROR' THREATENS THE WEST AND CALLS FOR LONE-ACTORS TO RISE UP

In his most recent audio-speech, Osama bin Laden's son, Hamza, popularly referred to as AQ's 'Prince of Terror', called upon 'martyrdom seekers' to attack in the West instead of immigrating to their battlefields, arguing that 'inflicting punishment on Jews and Crusaders where you are present is more vexing and severe for the enemy'. The speech stressed the importance of publicly communicating a clear attack rationale and prioritized the following attack targets:

1. Those who transgress against Islam and its Prophet
2. Jewish interests
3. Americans
4. NATO member states' interests
5. Russia

Hamza states in his July 2016 audio-speech (entitled 'We are all Usama') that AQ has grown in strength and numbers and threatens revenge against the US and their allies over the next decade and a half, not just for killing his father, but for what his death symbolized.

Hamza bin Laden was declared an international terrorist by the US State Department in January 2017 as he

appears to be taking on more responsibilities within the group since being admitted to AQ's leadership in mid-2015.

SECRET

THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

Threat levels: raised lowered remain

CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY .
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY .

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

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RESTRICTED TRAVEL BRIEF

TA 18/134-E // 2018-06-21

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

The Honourable Kirsty Duncan, Minister of Science and Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities, will travel to the United Kingdom (London, England, and Edinburgh, Scotland) 2018 06 27-29

INTRODUCTION

The Honourable Kirsty Duncan, Minister of Science and Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities, will travel to London, England, and Edinburgh, Scotland, in the United Kingdom (UK), from 2018 06 27-29.

ITAC has reviewed a draft program of the Minister's visit. From 2018 06 27-28, Minister Duncan will meet with UK government officials, Canadian postgraduate students, academic societies and private sector organizations in London to discuss science, technology and innovation issues. On 2018 06 29, she will fly to Edinburgh and may participate in a panel discussion on the relationship between science and politics at the University of Edinburgh.

Scope: This assessment only covers the threat from terrorism, defined as violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective. This assessment does not include the threat of violence from local or trans-national armed conflict, espionage, civil unrest or organized crime, as this does not fall within ITAC's mandate. Additionally, this assessment does not include the activities of groups or individuals who have actively protested against past international events and who may be motivated by various agendas, including environmental, anti-government or sectarian issues.

THE HONOURABLE KIRSTY DUNCAN

Minister of Science and
Minister of Sport and
Persons with Disabilities



Source: canada.ca

ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT NOTE

This report is based on classified and open source reporting up to 2018 06 21.

DEFINITIONS and HIGHLIGHT DISTINCTIONS are located at the last page.

Canada

THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS		Established	Raised	Lowered	Remains
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.				
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY.				
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR.				
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.				
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY.				

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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ANNEX

SIRC Annual Report 2017-2018
Summary of Reviews, Recommendations, Complaints and CSIS Responses

SIRC Review: Case Studies Regarding Information Sharing with Foreign Entities

For this review, SIRC examined four cases of information sharing where a potential risk of mistreatment existed, and examined CSIS documents to evaluate compliance with the 2011 Ministerial Direction on *Information Sharing with Foreign Entities*. Though SIRC found no evidence that CSIS used information obtained by mistreatment, nor directly contributed to human rights abuses when it shared information in these cases, SIRC was not satisfied that CSIS had adequately assessed and mitigated the potential risks of information sharing.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS prioritize the development of guidelines on assessing and documenting the risk of mistreatment, as well as the risks to the assurances and caveats not being respected. Such assessments should take into account the most recent and relevant information, including operational reporting.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. In addition to existing guidelines, the Service is adopting a new tiered model for exchanges with foreign agencies based on risk, which will be noted in the corresponding Foreign Arrangement Profile. The objectives of this new approach are to ensure that the Service's engagement with a foreign partner does not pose a substantial risk of mistreatment; only allow sharing of information which is not deemed to present a potential risk of mistreatment; and, ensure full compliance with the Ministerial Directive.

SIRC Recommendation:

When there is a substantial risk of mistreatment that needs to be mitigated in sharing or requesting information, the decision to share should be referred to the Director through the Information Sharing Evaluation Committee (ISEC), rather than an manager.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. The 28 September 2017 on requires that ISEC refer to the Director all matters where there is a substantial risk of mistreatment and where it is unable to determine if the risk can be mitigated. Under the new model, proposed exchanges of information deemed to be high risk must automatically be referred to ISEC and others will be prohibited outright. However, each case must be evaluated in context.

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SIRC Review: CSIS' Approach to Mental Health Issues

For this review, SIRC examined a sample of _____ identified by _____ as individuals who had undergone a assessment or consultation. Overall, SIRC is satisfied that CSIS' approach to mental health issues in _____. However, SIRC noted that CSIS' demand for support surpasses the latter's resource capabilities, _____. SIRC noted that without a standardized consultation protocol, _____ support. Finally, SIRC noted that _____ services are not being used to their potential, possibly hindering investigations.

SIRC Recommendation:
SIRC recommended that CSIS increase the resources available to _____ so that the section can keep up with the demand for its services.

CSIS Response:
The Service partially agrees with this recommendation, though notes that there are competing resource pressures. The Service has been working to address current vacancies and has also explored other strategies to increase capability. The Service will take into consideration the requirements in any future resource allocation exercises, while assessing competing requirements in other high priority areas.

SIRC Recommendation:
SIRC recommended that _____ create a standardized reference document identifying "red flag" behaviours

CSIS Response:
The Service agrees with this recommendation and is committed to meeting it in the coming fiscal year. _____ sees clear value in the creation of this tool which will assist _____ in identifying _____ for referral to _____ for assessment or consultation.

SIRC Review: CSIS' Right-Wing Extremism Investigation

For this review, SIRC examined all CSIS records relating to Right-Wing Extremism (RWE). SIRC found that CSIS activities complied with Ministerial Direction and the *CSIS Act*, and noted that CSIS successfully demonstrated the importance of partnerships with police and law enforcement agencies. SIRC plans to revisit this subject in the medium-term.

SIRC Recommendation:
SIRC recommended that CSIS determine the extent to which other regions' investigations of RWE could benefit from the CSIS-law enforcement collaborative model in place in Quebec Region.

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CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. Various mechanisms are in place across the regions to ensure effective collaboration exists between the Service and domestic law enforcement bodies, which would include collaboration on RWE as necessary. The extent to which the Quebec Region model could be duplicated in other regions is largely dependent upon the structure and mandate of the individual law enforcement bodies in those regions.

SIRC Review:

Program

For this review, SIRC examined all corporate and operational documentation related to the program and a sample of program. SIRC found that the program complied with Ministerial Direction and the CSIS Act, and found CSIS' de-confliction mechanisms with foreign partners to be adequate. SIRC also found that ethically treated and offered support, but raised concerns about the waiting period for assistance. SIRC noted that CSIS sought legal opinions related to the use of as needed, but still had concerns around potential gaps and legal risks with CSIS' online activities. SIRC also noted that not all have received the training due to resource limitations.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS request a comprehensive legal review of the program.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. The Service will request that the Department of Justice (DoJ) undertake a legal review of key aspects of the program.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that those who are currently be given training as soon as possible.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation and will make every effort to ensure that the receive the training course as soon as possible.

SIRC Review of a Foreign Station:

For this review, SIRC examined documents pertaining to activities of the stations and met with relevant personnel. SIRC noted that the stations have maintained positive relationships with all of their partners. However, SIRC found instances of non-compliance with internal policy where not all required caveats were included on information shared with foreign partners.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS institute a quality assurance mechanism to ensure all required caveats are included prior to sharing information with its partners.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. While some quality assurance is built into current policy requirements, the Service is actively updating the CSIS *Procedure on Caveats and Assurances*. As part of this policy work, increased quality assurance will also be achieved via the parallel development of training and technological support related to the use of caveats.

SIRC Review of a Foreign Station:

For this review, SIRC examined documents pertaining to activities of the station and met with relevant personnel. SIRC found that the has built a positive relationship with foreign and domestic partners at the mission, pointing to the role of the in particular.

SIRC Recommendation:

No formal recommendations were made, but SIRC suggested that CSIS and its domestic security and defence partners at missions adopt practices that promote strong relationships, including emphasizing training on the various mandates and responsibilities of those at the mission.

CSIS Response:

Nil

SIRC Review: CSIS Operations within

SIRC reviewed issues in SIRC found that CSIS designation does not capture important considerations beyond Additionally, SIRC perceived a communication gap between CSIS management and employees regarding activities within SIRC also found that CSIS faces challenges in and validating information in.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS develop a comprehensive strategic framework for operating in dangerous environments to:

1. Create a more sophisticated rationale for designating and consider the associated implications of such a designation;
2. Identify requirements for employee training pre-deployment;
3. Update policies and standard operating procedures;
4. Clarify Stakeholder roles and responsibilities;
5. Define expectations for and current feasibility of the and,
6. Develop a communications plan between management and employees specifically geared for high-risk deployments.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. The Service will continue to clarify designation rationales, but the fluidity of the mandates an adaptive and flexible approach.

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2. The Service agrees with this recommendation. The established pre-deployment training regime in the Service is robust and specifically aligned with the current regime. Should the regime be refined, the training regime will be adjusted accordingly, taking into account resource/financial/officer safety considerations.
3. The Service agrees with this recommendation. It is acknowledged that communication strategies regarding current, emerging and changing policies and SOPs can be clearer and more accessible.
4. The Service agrees with this recommendation. Roles and responsibility documents continue to be developed.
5. The Service agrees with this recommendation. The roles, responsibilities and mission expectations are clear and dependent upon the operating environment and will be included in the strategic framework. Numerous strategies are being explored to address resource constraints and to continually balance expectations against these constraints. This will not change, given financial realities and ongoing officer safety considerations.
6. The Service agrees with this recommendation. It is readily acknowledged that improving communication is a constant requirement and that managers and employees alike should aim to be better informed via effective two-way strategies. The Service always strives to ensure better communication.

SIRC Review: Threat Reduction Measures

SIRC found that the threat reduction measures reviewed complied with the CSIS Act and Ministerial Direction. No recommendations.

SIRC Review: CSIS' Response to the Federal Court Decision of October 2016

SIRC produced two reports on the matter of CSIS' response to the illegal retention of warranted third-party, non-threat-related communications data. SIRC also examined the Operational Data Analysis Centre's (ODAC) collection and retention of non-warranted datasets. SIRC found the assessment and management of non-warranted datasets with respect to privacy and legal risks to be unsatisfactory, and that CSIS had exceeded its legislative authorities with respect to section 12 of the CSIS Act and the Charter. In the second SIRC review, SIRC noted that CSIS had acted rapidly in identifying and destroying 70 percent of the metadata, and was satisfied with ongoing plans to address the remainder. However, SIRC found CSIS' definition and guidelines with respect to assessment and reporting of third-party data insufficient.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS continue to prioritize the implementation of a robust process for assessing the privacy impacts and legal risk associated with its datasets, particularly with respect to Canadians.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. Further to a 2016 draft DoJ legal opinion on data acquisition, the Service developed a policy framework to mitigate the legal risks. Given the significant national security risks associated with curtailing data analytics, the Service continues

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to rely on its existing legal authority under section 12 of the CSIS Act, but remains sensitive to privacy rights.

While the 2016 decision of the Federal Court did not address non-warranted collection of datasets, the Service agrees that broader concerns raised in the decision have implications for this collection.

The dataset framework introduced in Bill C-59 will effectively address legal risks and potential privacy impacts. New processes, systems and policies are being developed to ensure the Service is prepared to implement the Bill. This work will be informed by the Internal Audit Branch review of the implementation of the 2016 dataset procedures.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS develop a system for assessing the utility of individual datasets and that decisions regarding the continued retention of datasets be informed by those assessments.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with the overall recommendation, however, it disagrees with SIRC's conclusion regarding the utility of data analytics and questions the validity of its assessment methodology. Data analytics is an effective means of generating leads, providing or corroborating intelligence, and advancing investigations. The Service is developing a system for assessing the utility of individual datasets and for integrating these assessments into decisions regarding the retention of datasets. The record keeping requirements under Bill C-59, along with enhanced analytic systems, will allow for validation of retained datasets based on operational utility. Under Bill C-59, the process by which CSIS seeks further authorization to retain a dataset, after its initial authorized retention period, will also demonstrate the operational utility of the dataset.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS implement as soon as practicable a data control system in its operational database that can account for the provenance and access controls on each piece of reported data.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. Within ODAC data holdings, governance systems have already been introduced to track the provenance and life cycle of data elements. Bill C-59 requirements will further enhance existing access controls, including limiting access to designated employees.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS develop a strategic approach to data collection and analysis across the organization, including with respect to data governance, performance measurement and the integration of data analysis with investigations.

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CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. The Service believes that ODAC achieved its strategic objectives as defined by the 2005 Data Exploitation Task Force. Given the value of data collection, an enhanced strategic approach to data collection and analysis across the organization is imperative. Bill C-59 creates a framework to achieve this with robust safeguards.

The *en banc* decision of October 2016 provided definitive interpretation of CSIS obligations with respect to retention and analysis, leading to significant efforts to re-align collection, retention and analysis to ensure compliance. Efforts are being expended towards effective performance measurement.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS purge the dataset from ODAC holdings and the operational database, with the exception of records that have been used to generate threat-related reports. CSIS should also take steps to identify and purge any bulk data reported in the operational database without sufficient assessment for non-threat-related records.

CSIS Response:

The Service continues to assess this recommendation. At the point of initial collection under warrant in 2007, and again in 2016 when the Service began to examine the legal regime applicable to datasets following a significant Federal Court decision, the Service believed that the data in question was lawfully retained given it directly related to terrorism investigations. The data is subject of an ongoing compliance review. The Service is of the view that it would not be in the interest of national security to purge the data until the results of the review are known, but has restricted access to the data in question and has proactively advised the Federal Court of SIRC's findings on this data.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that all decisions to retain immediately reportable datasets be based on documented assessments so that compliance can be verified.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. As part of its ongoing business modernization initiative, the Service has endeavoured to enhance key functions and clarify roles and responsibilities within the organization, as well as establish better case management. These efforts are ongoing and will lead to better mechanisms to properly document rationales underpinning decisions. The Service has initiated projects to establish a contemporary case management system that will assist employees in managing and properly documenting all aspects of their operational work, which will support the assessment of all data and information.

SIRC Recommendation:

Henceforth, all bulk datasets be managed centrally to ensure that they are assessed in a consistent and well-documented fashion, including immediately reportable datasets that have already been collected.

CSIS Response:

The Service partially agrees with this recommendation. Throughout the review period, the Service was engaged in efforts to draft Bill C-59 and prepare for the new dataset regime. The Service intends to centralize all but immediately reportable and publically available datasets within a single branch which can only be accessed by designated employees, as per Bill C-59. Immediately reportable datasets are defined in this manner as they have a clear threat nexus and can be retained in the Service's section 12 database. Accordingly, immediately reportable datasets will not be centralized and subject to the same access requirements as the datasets that will be retained under the new proposed section 11 datasets framework of Bill C-59.

Presently, determining whether something is threat-related predominantly depends on human factors; however, through the continued use and development of CSIS' new intelligence platform, the Service will soon have better metrics to assess the utility of information from all types of collection. This will include a better understanding of how the utility of certain information diminishes over time, which will help inform decisions on appropriate retention periods. The Service is determined to develop new and updated guidance for intelligence professionals to help them make more accurate decisions about the nature of perceived threats, informing disposition and retention actions.

SIRC Certification of the Annual Report of the Minister

SIRC was satisfied with the Director's report for 2016-2017. No recommendations.

SIRC Complaint Investigation: Delay and Racial Prejudice in Visa Application – Complaint Pursuant to Section 41 of the CSIS Act

SIRC investigated a complaint under section 41 of the CSIS Act which alleged that the complainant's Visa application had taken too long to process, was denied due to racial prejudice based on the complainant's nationality, and was denied based on unfounded assumptions. SIRC found that CSIS had provided advice to the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) within a reasonable timeframe and had sufficient concerns in determining the complainant a threat to national security. SIRC dismissed the complaint, finding the allegations unsupported.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS continue its efforts in collaborating with CBSA and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) for the creation of annexes to the respective Memoranda of Understanding with a view of improving efficiency and information sharing in their processes.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation. The Service and CBSA resumed work on an Information Sharing Annex in 2017 and have had several productive discussions. The Service is awaiting CBSA comments on the draft, after which the two agencies will work to finalize the Information Sharing Annex. The Service and CBSA are also developing a separate annex for operational cooperation.

The Service has not had further discussions with IRCC regarding the development of an information-sharing annex but we will explore this possibility with IRCC again.

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SIRC Complaint Investigation: The Collection of Information about Citizens and Groups Engaged in Peaceful and Lawful Activities – Complaint Pursuant to Section 41 of the CSIS Act

SIRC investigated a complaint pursuant to section 41 of the CSIS Act in which the complainant alleged that the Service had investigated groups for their engagement in lawful advocacy, protest and dissent activities, and had shared intelligence with other government departments and the private sector. SIRC found no evidence that CSIS had investigated any peaceful advocacy or dissent, or that CSIS had disseminated information. SIRC dismissed the complaint.

SIRC Recommendation:

SIRC recommended that CSIS prioritize inclusive public discussions with the groups involved in the present complaint, where possible, having regard to the classified nature of certain topics.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with this recommendation and will consider it as part of a broader stakeholder engagement strategy. The Service routinely communicates with Canadians and stakeholders to explain our mandate for the purpose of informing and seeking community support.

SIRC Complaint Investigation: Denial of Security Clearance – Complaint Pursuant to Section 42 of the CSIS Act

SIRC investigated a complaint made under section 42 of the CSIS Act made by a Government of Canada employee who was denied a Secret security clearance. CSIS recommended that the complainant's clearance be denied, citing connections with government officials and character features as security concerns. The complainant alleged that a clearance had been denied based on the complainant's and that the clearance process was too lengthy. SIRC found that there were reasonable grounds to deny a clearance and dismissed the complaint.

SIRC Recommendation:

CSIS, as the centre for the assessment of security clearances should, through means it deems appropriate, continue to stress to its client departments and agencies that there needs to be compliance by Minister's Offices with the *Accountable Government, A guide for Ministers and Ministers of State*.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with the recommendation. Under the Policy on Government Security (PGS), CSIS has a role as a Lead Security Agency to do outreach related to security clearance screening and does so through engagement with the Departmental Security Officer (DSO) community which functions as a center of excellence. The risk assessed by each DSO and mitigation of the risk of granting the clearance falls to each DSO and the role of evaluating compliance with the PGS or the Standard for Security Screening falls to the individual Departments and to Treasury Board Secretariat.

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-10-

SIRC Recommendation:

While SIRC assessed that CSIS actions in this matter were expeditious, in order to diminish the possibility of delay in the staffing of positions in Ministers Offices and to ensure compliance with policy concerning exempt staff, SIRC recommended that CSIS arrange to have additional resources available for clearances of exempt staff in times of forecasted political change such as a general election.

CSIS Response:

The Service agrees with the recommendation. The Service has trained its security screening resources to be able to more effectively respond to security screening surges. The Service also works with client departments to receive advance warning of surges in all screening areas and to establish manageable timelines.

SIRC Complaint Investigation: Religious Profiling and Conspiracy – Complaint Pursuant to Section 41 of the CSIS Act

SIRC investigated a complaint under section 41 of the CSIS Act in which the complainant, alleged that CSIS investigators had asked questions and made requests that amounted to religious profiling and that the Service was involved in a conspiracy against the complainant and his organizations. SIRC concluded that there was little evidence to support the complainant's allegations of profiling and found no evidence of a conspiracy. SIRC dismissed the complaint. No recommendations.

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

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TA 18/39-E // 2018-02-15

SECRET//

Violent right-wing extremism in Canada and Europe – a comparative analysis

INTRODUCTION

On 2017 01 29, Alexandre Bissonnette, an individual reported to be supportive of right-wing extremist (RWE) views, conducted a fatal attack at a mosque in Québec City. Bissonnette is charged with six counts of first-degree murder and six counts of attempted murder using a restricted firearm, and will stand trial beginning March 2018. A year out from the Québec attack, this paper considers the threat posed by RWE individuals and groups in Canada who go beyond freedom of expression and the right to protest, and beyond criminal acts of hatred, to conduct acts of terrorism inspired by RWE ideology. The paper compares this threat to that posed by individuals and groups in Europe, where a number of violent RWE attacks have occurred in recent years.

The RWE milieu comprises a complex and diverse range of individuals and groups espousing views on a number of issues and grievances, including white supremacy, anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, anti-immigration, homophobia, anti-government, anti-law enforcement and racism, among others. RWEs use various means to express their views. In Canada, activities short of promoting violence are protected by The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the rights of freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.

RWE activities that cross the criminal threshold are defined as "hate crimes" if they are found to be motivated by hatred toward an identifiable group as defined in 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code of Canada. In order for activity to be deemed an act of terror, a further specifier is required with respect to motivation, namely being done with the intention of intimidating the public or a segment of the public, with regard to its security or compelling a person, a government, or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act (section 83.01 of the Criminal Code). Violent activities by RWE individuals or groups in Canada over recent years have not, as far as the ITAC is aware, been identified as having legally crossed the threshold to terrorist activity.

RWE groups in Canada



Source: Vice News

KEY JUDGEMENTS

- Canada's RWE milieu in support of their goals

espouse the use of violence

ASSESSMENT NOTE

This report is based on open source information and intelligence.

The European context

The RWE milieu in Europe is grounded in anti-immigration, anti-Islam, anti-European Union and anti-Semitic stances, according to open sources. The recent influx of migrants to Europe caused by the Syrian conflict has also been used by RWE groups to promote xenophobic and Islamophobic positions, according to an EU trend report.

These strong nationalist ideologies have been boosted by some political parties that have recently become prominent throughout Europe. In December 2017, Austria became the only western European state with a ruling far-right party in government with the coalition between the far-right Freedom Party and the conservative People's Party. Far-right ideology in Europe has also seen political legitimization in the rise of the 'Alternative für Deutschland' (AfD) party in Germany and the 'Front National' in France. The March 2016 election marked the first time in more than 60 years that a far-right party sat in the federal parliament in Germany, while France's far-right leader Marine Le Pen contested the 2017 French presidential election and attained almost 34 percent of the national vote in the second round.

While Europe has seen the legitimate emergence of far right-wing political parties, there are also many RWE groups throughout Europe that espouse violent rhetoric. Open source reporting indicates that this segment of the European RWE milieu is fragmented, lacks consistent organization and leadership, and suffers from internal conflict, meaning that violent RWE attacks are primarily carried out by individuals, or loosely coordinated networks or groups. Some recent examples of RWE violence in Europe include:

- Three members of the Nordic Resistance Movement were sentenced in July 2017 for attacks in southern Sweden targeting newly arrived migrants. The three were responsible for an unexploded device found near a campsite accommodating migrants and a bomb that seriously injured one person in January 2017. The members were convicted on a range of counts, including attempted murder.
- Darren Osborne drove a rented van into worshippers leaving evening prayers at the Finsbury Park Mosque in north London on 2017 06 19, killing one and injuring 11 others. Osborne was convicted of terrorism-related murder¹ and attempted murder. A letter found in the van, which was believed to have been written by Osborne, contained a lengthy diatribe with strong racial and political overtones, opposing the presence of Muslims and migrants.
- In July 2011, Anders Breivik detonated a bomb outside the Parliament building in Oslo, Norway, killing eight people. He then shot dead 69 people, mostly teenagers, at a summer youth camp on the island of Utoya. He had posted white supremacist and anti-Muslim material online and had sent a 1,500-page manifesto the day he committed the attacks.

European governments have been working to curb the spread of violent RWE groups. According to media reporting, in September 2017 and January 2018, British authorities arrested and charged several individuals under anti-terror laws for associating with the proscribed RWE group 'National Action'. In 2016, 'National Action' became the first British RWE organization to be banned for promoting violence and acts of terrorism. Additionally, in November 2017, Finnish courts banned the Nordic Resistance Movement. The group, with roots in Sweden, attacked LGBTQ events, clashed with anti-racist demonstrators and carried out bomb attacks on refugee centres.

¹ ITAC notes that the definition for terrorism as it relates to right-wing extremism differs across European countries. That said, given the varying legislation, ITAC assumes that the legal threshold for terrorism-related charges have been met in each jurisdiction.

RWE threat to politicians in Europe

November 2017 – Andreas Hollstein, the mayor of the western German town of Altena, was attacked by a man wielding a 30 centimetre-long knife who was shouting criticisms of Hollstein's liberal policy towards asylum seekers.

July 2016 – British Labour Party Member of Parliament (MP) Jo Cox was shot and stabbed to death by Thomas Mair during the EU referendum campaign. Cox was a vocal advocate for Britain to remain in the EU. Mair was sentenced to serve a whole-life sentence due to the exceptional seriousness of the offence, as the court believed Cox's murder was committed to advance a cause associated with Nazism.

October 2015 – Mayoral candidate Henriette Reker was stabbed as she campaigned in Cologne's election. Reker was campaigning on her support for Germany's "open-door" refugee policy and her attacker confessed to having xenophobic motives and links to the far-right movement in Germany.

ASSESSMENTS

The Canadian Context

Right-wing extremism has been described as "encompassing a large, loose, heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals espousing a wide range of grievances and positions, including: anti-government/individual sovereignty, racism, fascism, white supremacy/white nationalism, anti-Semitism, nativism/anti-immigration, anti-globalization/anti-free trade, anti-abortion, homophobia, anti-taxation, and pro-militia/pro-gun rights stances." In Canada, a complex and diverse range of groups and individuals espouse many of these positions.

According to research by Dr. Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, Canadian academics who study right-wing extremism, historically Canada's immigration policy and legislation, as well as economic fluctuations, i.e. periods of higher unemployment and inflation rates, have influenced the RWE milieu in Canada. Scrivens argues that Canada's acceptance of refugees in 2015 in the wake of the Syrian civil war and emergence of DAESH in Syria and Iraq, has contributed to increasing momentum in right-wing extremism. Scrivens also assessed that the November 2016 US election of a presidential candidate who campaigned on right-wing populist and white nationalist issues helped galvanize Canada's extant white supremacist ideologies, identities, movements and practices.

According to Perry and Scrivens, as of mid-2015 there were at least 100 'far-right' groups operating in the country, with a wide range of views and membership numbers. In a description of right-wing extremism in Canada, the RCMP includes white supremacist, nationalist, neo-Nazi, xenophobic and racist groups. Perry also suggests that, in the recent past, an increasing number of people are engaging with the RWE movement online.

Right-wing extremism in Canada exists primarily, though not exclusively, on the Internet, with members of some groups meeting in person. It should be noted that, as in Europe, some individuals associated with far-right ideology have had connections to Canadian politics – a number of candidates in Ontario municipal elections in 2014, for example. However, the electoral success of such individuals remains limited in Canada.

RWE groups in Canada use various methods to convey their views; for example, staging protest actions or expressing hate online.

Hate crimes in Canada

Police reported violent crimes (e.g. assault, threats, criminal harassment) in Canada – 2016:

- Hate crimes were up by 3% from 2015 to 2016, but below the number reported in 2009, the year comparable data became available
- Hate crimes represent less than 0.1% of crimes (excluding traffic violations)
- Hate crimes targeting South Asians and Arabs or West Asians, Jewish population, sexual orientation, were on the rise
- Hate crimes declined against Muslims in 2016
- Increased violence in hate crimes in 2016.
- Hate crimes targeting sexual orientation continued to be the most violent hate crimes

Source: Police-reported hate crime, 2016
Statistics Canada



Canadian RWEs engage in threatening activities targeting specific individuals or groups, including refugees, which may fall under the definition of "hate crime" under the Criminal Code of Canada.

examples of acts of serious violence include:

- On 2017 01 29, 27-year-old Alexandre Bissonnette shot attendees inside the Grande Mosquée de Québec, in Québec City. Six people were killed and 19 injured. On the anniversary of the attack, Canada's Prime Minister issued a statement describing the event as a "terrorist attack against all Canadians, meant to test our resolve and weaken our values," and voiced the resolve to fight Islamophobia and all forms of hatred and discrimination.
- In June 2014, 24-year-old Justin Bourque, who had espoused anti-authority, anti-law enforcement views, shot five RCMP officers in Moncton, New Brunswick, killing three and seriously injuring two others.

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

	Established	Raised	Lowered	Remains
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .			
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ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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Violent right-wing extremism in Canada and Europe

INTRODUCTION

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The RWE milieu comprises a complex and diverse range of individuals and groups espousing views on a number of issues and grievances, including white supremacy, anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, anti-immigration, homophobia, anti-government, anti-law enforcement and racism, among others. RWEs use various means to express their views. In Canada, activities short of promoting violence are protected by The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the rights of freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.

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Source: Police-reported hate crime, 2016 Statistics Canada

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Right-wing extremism in Canada exists primarily, though not exclusively, on the Internet, with members of some groups meeting in person.

RWE groups in Canada use various methods to convey their views; for example, staging protest actions or expressing hate online.

While some Canadian RWE activities may fall under the definition of "hate crime" under the Criminal Code of Canada,

some examples of acts of serious violence include:

- On 2017 01 29, 27-year-old Alexandre Bissonnette shot attendees inside the Grande Mosquée de Québec, in Québec City. Six people were killed and 19 injured. On the anniversary of the attack, Canada's Prime Minister issued a statement describing the event as a "terrorist attack against all Canadians, meant to test our resolve and weaken our values," and voiced the resolve to fight Islamophobia and all forms of hatred and discrimination.
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Intelligence Assessment Évaluation du renseignement

CSIS IA 2016-17/43

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada: a Preliminary Assessment

Key Assessments

Québec City Attack

On January 29, 2017, Alexandre Bissonnette, a 27 year old resident of Québec City and student at the Université de Laval, shot multiple attendees inside the Grande mosquée de Québec, located near his apartment. His attack resulted in the deaths of six individuals and the wounding of 19 others. Bissonnette has been charged with six counts of first degree murder and five counts of attempted murder using a restricted weapon.

While

open information suggests that he held extreme anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, anti-feminist and white-nationalist views.

Violent Right-Wing Extremism: More than Just Hate

1. Right-wing extremism in Canada includes a complex range of groups and individuals espousing a broad range of issues and grievances including: white supremacy/white nationalism/white religion, anti-Semitism, homophobia, nativism/anti-immigration, anti-government/anti-law enforcement and racism. Within this range of groups is a subset which either overtly, or under the guise of non-violent, cultural or religious preservation, focus their on-line hate towards Islam, Muslim immigrants, multiculturalism and those Canadian politicians who are seen as supporting Muslim-friendly legislation.

2.

Historically, right-wing extremist violence has been infrequent,¹

Never-the-less, there are more than a thousand hate-driven incidents reported to police in Canada each year.

Hate Crime in Canada

3. According to the most recent statistics produced by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS)¹, there were 1,295 cases of police-reported hate crime in 2014 as compared to 1,165 in 2013 (representing an increase of 11.2%). Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver reported the highest number of incidents in 2013 and 2014. That said, the cities of Hamilton and Thunder Bay reported the highest number of incidents per 100,000 people although the number of reported incidents for both cities decreased from 2013 to 2014 (from 95 to 82 and 25 to 16 incidents, respectively). (U)

¹ The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS), in co-operation with the policing community, collects police-reported crime statistics through the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR). The UCR Survey was designed to measure the incidence of crime in Canadian society and its characteristics. (U)

Defining Violent and Non-Violent Right-Wing Extremism

Extremism is not defined in Canada's Criminal Code. For the purpose of this assessment, extremism is defined as holding political, social, economic or religious views that propose far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order, while supporting non-criminal and sometimes criminal acts to achieve these aims. Violent extremism, therefore, can be defined as serious threats, harm, murder, mayhem, and damage to property which are motivated and justified by extremist beliefs. At the heart of all right-wing extremism is hatred and fear. Only a very small number of people, however, act upon their extreme beliefs and engage in serious actions of violence or attempt to encourage others to do so.

Manifestation of Hate?

The Toronto Police Service identified an increase in the targeting of the Muslim community in November 2015 which it assessed could be attributed to negative backlash following the attacks in Paris, France, and the federal government's Syrian refugee resettlement plan. (U)

4. In Québec City, the number of police-reported hate-crimes increased from 19 in 2013 to 50 in 2014. On a per 100,000 population basis, incidents increased from 2.4 in 2013 (below the national average of 3.3) to 6.3 in 2014 (above the national average of 3.7). (U)

5. While there has been an increase in the number of police-reported hate-crimes nationally, the number of incidents per city varied, and in some cases decreased. Reported hate-crime in Montréal increased by 9.9% from 2013 to 2014 (and approximately 69% between 2013 and 2016). The Toronto Police Service experienced an 11.5% increase during the same period but witnessed a decline of approximately 8% from 2014 to 2015). Collectively the majority of police-reported hate-crimes were motivated by hatred of a religion (primarily Judaism and Islam) or ethnicity (Black, Arab/Southeast Asian). (U)

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada to 2006

6. Right-wing extremism and the resulting violence are not new in Canada. The country's first race riot occurred in Nova Scotia in 1784. Racial segregation was legalized in Ontario schools in 1849, and numerous acts of right-wing violence occurred against Chinese and Japanese immigrants to British Columbia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, not to mention the range of discriminatory legislation targeting Canada's Indigenous population.

7.

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2 Neo-Nazis borrow elements from Nazi doctrine, including ultra-nationalism, racism, ableism, xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and imitating the Fourth Reich. Holocaust denial is a common feature, as is incorporation of Nazi symbols and admiration of Adolf Hitler. Racist skinheads may also be neo-Nazis but are more prone to extreme violence towards non-white immigrants as well as anti-racist activists and non-racist skinheads whom they consider traitors.

8. Despite attempts by the violent right-wing extremist milieu to capitalize upon the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and through the use of racist music and the internet,

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada Since 2006

Many of the groups identified in 2006 have disbanded

Despite these limitations there have been numerous incidents of violence perpetrated by right-wing extremists since 2006.

10. There has been a significant growth of on-line groups (such as on Facebook) since 2006, focussing on a broad range of extreme right-wing positions, including white supremacy.

Anders Breivik
"The New Far Right"

On July 22, 2011, Breivik detonated a car bomb in Oslo, Norway, killing eight people and critically injuring more than ten others. He subsequently travelled to the island of Utoya where he shot and killed 69 people at a youth camp run by the youth league of the Norwegian Labour Party.

Breivik explained his extreme right-wing views (anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism) in his 1,516-page manifesto.

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Anti-Government, Anti-Police Ideology

18. a sub set which holds extreme anti-government, anti-law enforcement views. Often referred to in Canada as Freemen on the Land (FOTL), the ideology originated in the United States within the much more violent Sovereign Citizen Movement and is often linked to various U.S. militia groups. Generally speaking, Freemen regard government as a corporation, and an individual's relationship to it as contractual. Therefore, adherents to the ideology assert that they have the right to separate themselves from the government, or renegotiate their relationship with it. In order to become free, or sovereign, individuals submit a "claim of rights" to any legislated governmental authority of their choice. In their view, this act permits an individual to become a "human being" who lawfully revokes or denies consent to be represented and governed, and exists completely free of all statutory restraints.

The Moncton Shooting

While the vast majority of FOTL adherents are non-violent, it should be noted that in June 2014, Justin Bourque shot five RCMP officers, killing three and seriously wounding two. Bourque had previously espoused online a range of anti-law enforcement and other views shared by FOTL adherents.

19. This applies to almost all elements of their lives. For example, adherents deny the government (or the Crown) the authority to levy taxes, require driver's licenses or register weapons.

Right-Wing Extremism in Québec

21. Media reporting from January 22, 2017 suggests that hate crime in Québec increased by almost 40% from 2013 to 2014, while the incidents of reported hate crime in Montréal increased by approximately 69% from 2013 to 2016.

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Right-Wing Extremism in the United States and Western Europe

27.

According to the Extremist Crime Database, there were over 370 homicides committed by violent right-wing extremists in the U.S. from 1990-2010, claiming more than 600 lives.

Dylan Roof: The Modern Face of Domestic Terrorism?

According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Dylan Roof (the perpetrator of the 2015 Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church massacre) acted alone and was not a member of a racist hate group.

Instead, he appears to have been indoctrinated into the world of white nationalism online. In his 2,400-word manifesto, for example, he described becoming "racially aware" in the world of white supremacist websites following the controversy over the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012.

As he was murdering his victims, Roof told them that black people were "taking over our country" and "rap[ing] our women."

29. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center⁴, the number of hate groups in the U.S. reached a peak of 1,018 in 2011, followed by a steep decline to 784 by 2014.

30. In Europe, right-wing extremism is widespread, driven by unemployment, immigration, nativism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Islamic sentiment. The last decade has seen the most visible

⁴ The Southern Poverty Law Center is an American non-profit legal advocacy organization specializing in civil rights and public interest litigation.

cases featured in the media, including the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany, Anders Breivik's attacks in Norway, a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities in Hungary and Sweden, and the 2016 murder of British Labour Party politician Jo Cox by an ultra-nationalist. right-wing organizations in Europe are more openly affiliated with registered political parties. Far right political parties such as the Front National (France), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), Party for Freedom (Netherlands), and Golden Dawn (Greece) promote policies which appeal to the broader right-wing extremist milieu. In Germany, for example, various fringe neo-Nazi groups continue to engage in serious acts of violence against visible minorities and recent immigrants/ asylum seekers. Other extreme groups such as PEGIDA have attempted to capitalize on populist anger on a range of issues, including globalization, immigration and multiculturalism. In 2013, Germany's domestic security agency estimated that there were almost 22,000 far-right extremists in the country, with roughly 10,000 considered potentially militant. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported 1,408 acts of far-right violence in 2015, compared to 990 in 2014.

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

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TA 17/185-E // 2017-11-28

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THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

CRITICAL
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW
VERY LOW

ITAC assesses
that a violent act of
terrorism could occur.

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
OBJECTIVES

1. This threat assessment updates the Canadian National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL)
last published on 2017 06 19 - TA 17/74-E

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ASSESSMENT NOTE

This assessment is based on all-source information.



These incidents bear the characteristics of the attack methodology called for by DAESH in its propaganda and online chats, and it resembles attacks perpetrated by extremists internationally. In spite of these parallels and the presence of a DAESH flag in the alleged perpetrator's car, DAESH has not claimed the attack, likely because the alleged attacker was captured alive, and not martyred.

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THE REHAB DUGHMOSH INCIDENT






Source: CTV News

On 3 June 2017, Rehab Dughmosh entered a Canadian Tire store in the Cedarbrae Mall in Scarborough, Ontario, where she began swinging a golf club in the paint department, allegedly shouting "I'm here for Syria. I'm going to kill everybody" and "Allahu akbar!" Dughmosh was carrying a large knife, which customers and staff managed to wrest from her grip, along with a concealed bow.

In September 2017, Dughmosh was indicted on 14 terrorism-related charges, among others for attempted murder and attempting to travel to Syria to join DAESH in 2016. She had been deemed fit to stand trial, in August 2017. In a September pre-trial hearing, Dughmosh refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Canadian legal system, saying, "I do not believe what you believe. Tell [the judge] I am still a supporter of the Islamic State [...]."

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

Threat levels:  raised  lowered  remains	
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY .
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY .

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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The Faces of Right-Wing Extremism Similarities Between Attacks

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Complexity of the Right-Wing Landscape

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Below-Ground

In the aftermath of the January 29 shooting inside the Grande mosquée de Québec, Soldiers of Odin Canada (SOO-C) leadership quickly disavowed any link to the shooter or support for his actions.

The Changing Face of Right-Wing Extremism

The Next Wave of Extremists Will Be Green

Militant environmentalism is coming. And we aren't ready for it.

BY JAMIE BARTLETT

SEPTEMBER 1, 2017

Military strategists are always fighting the last war, the same is true of those who work on countering

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Overview

Challenges

The Faces of Right-Wing Extremism

Complexity of the Canadian Far-Right

Legal/ Illegal/ Potential Threat to National Security

The Changing Face of the Far-Right in Canada

Looking Forward

"The measure of a society – a just society – is not whether we stand up for people's rights when it's easy or popular to do so. It's whether we recognize rights when it's difficult, when it's unpopular."

The Faces of Right-Wing Extremism Similarities Between Attacks

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Overview

Acts not Ideology

Scope of Non-Sunni Islamist Extremism in Canada

Terminology / Limitations

Complexity of the Canadian Far Right

The Changing Face of the Far Right in Canada

Looking Forward

"The measure of a society – a just society – is not whether we stand up for people's rights when it's easy or popular to do so. It's whether we recognize rights when it's difficult, when it's unpopular."

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Complexity of the Right-Wing Landscape

ALT-RIGHT

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THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

VERY LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL

ITAC assesses
that a violent act of
terrorism could occur.

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OBJECTIVES

1. This threat assessment updates the Canadian National
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last published on 2017 01 19 - ITAC 1706-E.

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ASSESSMENT NOTE

This assessment is based on open source information and informed by intelligence

ATTACK ON THE GRANDE MOSQUEE DE QUÉBEC



On 2017 01 29 Laval University student and Quebec City resident, Alexandre Bissonnette, entered the Grande Mosquée de Québec and opened fire on individuals attending prayers, killing six and wounding 19.

The full scope of Bissonnette's personal and/or political motive is not entirely clear, apart from his stated hatred of Muslims. Open information indicates that he holds views consistent with extreme right-wing ideology, e.g. anti-Muslim, anti-feminist, white nationalist.

Methods

8. **Global Campaigns for Inspired, Domestic Attacks Continue:** Sunni extremist propaganda continues to call on Western-based supporters to 'become martyrs' and attack in their homelands. DAESH continues to invest in its multilingual multi-platform campaign in an effort to grow its global support base, and similarly AQ is reinvigorating its own external communications efforts (See text box entitled AQ's 'Prince of Terror' on this page). In addition to traditional hard targets, supporters are encouraged to attack local, public spaces using readily available weapons, as seen in the June 2017 London Bridge and Borough Market attack in the UK. On June 6, 2017, the Nashir News Telegram channel affiliated with DAESH, published two statements warning the "crusaders" of more attacks to be carried out by "thousands of lonely [i.e. lone] lions." The channel called on Muslims living in the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, Canada, Belgium, Australia and Italy to avoid shopping centers, roads and parking areas, which it described as "targets for the soldiers of the Caliphate."

9. Canada continues to be named periodically in DAESH propaganda. Issue no. 9 of *Rumiyah* (DAESH's propaganda publication) recommends attacking soft targets such as night clubs, movie theatres, busy shopping malls, popular restaurants, concert halls, university campuses, public swimming pools and generally any busy, enclosed area, in order to maximize the potential for hostage-taking and mass casualty shootings. In February 2017, AQ's Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) released an English translation of a kidnapping guide, possibly written in late 2000 which details the benefit of and the tactics of kidnapping Westerners.

AQ'S PRINCE OF TERROR THREATENS THE WEST AND CALLS FOR LONE-ACTORS TO RISE UP

In his most recent audio-speech, Osama bin Laden's son, Hamza, popularly referred to as AQ's 'Prince of Terror', called upon martyrdom seekers to attack in the West instead of immigrating to their battlefields, arguing that inflicting punishment on Jews and Crusaders where you are present is more vexing and severe for the enemy. The speech stressed the importance of publicly communicating a clear attack rationale and prioritized the following attack targets:

1. Those who transgress against Islam and its Prophet
2. Jewish interests
3. Americans
4. NATO member states' interests
5. Russia

Hamza states in his July 2016 audio-speech (entitled 'We are all Usama') that AQ has grown in strength and numbers and threatens revenge against the US and their allies over the next decade and a half, not just for killing his father, but for what his death symbolized.

Hamza bin Laden was declared an international terrorist by the US State Department in January 2017.

as he appears to be taking on more responsibilities within the group since being admitted to AQ's leadership in mid-2015.

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

Threat levels: raised lowered remains

CRITICAL

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **HIGHLY LIKELY** and **COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY**.

HIGH

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **LIKELY**.

MEDIUM

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism **COULD OCCUR**.

LOW

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY**.

VERY LOW

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY**.

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

ITAC

CIET

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

2017-01-18

SECRET

THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

VERY LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL

ITAC assesses
that a violent act of
terrorism could occur.

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OBJECTIVE

1. This threat assessment updates the Canadian National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) and the threat to uniformed personnel, last published on 2016 07 28 (See ITAC 16/116). Since the NTTL was last raised (to MEDIUM in October 2014), transnational terrorist groups such as DAESH, Al-Qaida (AQ), and their affiliates continue to pose a persistent threat to Canada and Canadian interests globally. Of further concern is the ongoing threat from extremists in Canada who continue to aspire or plot violent acts of terror

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150th Anniversary of Canadian
Confederation is to be
Celebrated across Canada
throughout 2017



CANADA 150

ASSESSMENT NOTE

This assessment is based on all-source information

ITAC 17/05-E

Key Judgements

- Canadians have travelled abroad to conflict zones to support terrorist groups, and returnees to Canada could pose a significant threat due to acquired training and enhanced credibility in the eyes of fellow radicalized, or radicalizing, Canadians. This perceived standing could enable them to recruit and encourage other aspiring violent extremists in Canada. Those Canadians whose attempts to travel abroad have been thwarted also represent a threat, in that they could redirect their efforts to carry out attacks at home.
- As DAESH loses territory in Syria and Iraq, the death and displacement of foreign fighters is to be expected.
- Canadian uniformed personnel including military, security, and law enforcement members, and their installations, face a specific and persistent threat, having been singled out as particularly desirable targets in extremist propaganda.

Terrorism Threat Levels for Canada

Canada MEDIUM ↔

ITAC

assesses that a violent act of terrorism in Canada could occur.

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Actors


3. **Canada-based Extremists:** Extremist ideologies, such as those espoused by DAESH, AQ, and their affiliates, have resonated amongst some Canadians.

Extremist propaganda regularly exhorts listeners to carry out attacks at home using commonly available weapons, and such messaging has found traction with some Canadian extremists.

4. **Calls for Homeland Attacks Resonate:** Aaron Driver's thwarted attack reiterates the increasing threat of lone actors inspired by extremist propaganda such as the Rumiya, Dabiq, and Inspire publications. Despite being restricted under a Peace Bond, Driver utilized various ComSec measures to maintain an online presence, which enabled him to develop an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Driver's alleged intended target was an unsecured public area (soft-target), during rush hour, and meant to inflict maximum injury and damage; he also recorded a pledge of allegiance video so that DAESH could claim responsibility. See text box entitled 'Aaron DRIVER' for more details on Driver's actions and DAESH's claim.

Aaron DRIVER

On August 10, 2016, police responded to allied information indicating that an imminent attack might be underway. Officials identified and located Aaron Driver in Strathroy, ON, an individual who was under a peace bond for suspected links to terrorism. While attempting to depart with an explosive-laden backpack, police intercepted Driver who was then fatally shot after attempting to detonate the IED.



DAESH claimed Aaron Driver as a 'soldier' via various channels including Amaq and al-Bayan Radio News Agencies shortly after the incident. The language used was similar to that used in past attacks (such as in the France, Germany and Belgium-based attacks) stating that the operation was carried out in response to calls to target coalition countries.

Image Source: SITE Intel Group

6. **Canadian Extremist Travellers and Returnees:** The number of Canadian extremists who have travelled abroad is currently estimated at _____ with approximately _____ having since returned to Canada. While Canadian extremists have travelled to support terror groups in many countries, Syria and Iraq maintains the highest concentration of Canadian extremists at this time.

8. Other radicalized Canadians who aspire to or seek to travel to, a conflict zone, but are unable to do so, may redirect efforts to carry out an attack in Canada. Couture-Rouleau (2014), Bibeau (2014), and most recently Aaron Driver, all desired to travel abroad to join a terrorist group before deciding to conduct a domestic attack. Since the last NTTL update, the RCMP have arrested and issued peace bonds with several individuals that the RCMP believe have the potential to commit a terrorism-related offence. (See text box entitled Canadian Terror-related Arrests in Canada: July-December 2016)

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9. **DAESH Abroad:** The success of anti-DAESH coalition activities, including support to the current operation to reduce the group's grip on Mosul, has directly affected DAESH's structure and territorial control. DAESH has lost a vast supply of economic resources and as of December 2016, open sources report losses of around 50 percent of DAESH territory in Iraq and over 20 percent of territory in Syria.

Change in DAESH Spokesperson ~ Change in Canadian Influence?

DAESH's former spokesperson and head of external operations, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani died in an air strike in Syria on 30 August 2016 (See TH 16/132). His rhetoric, which often specifically named Canada,

Since Adnani's death, DAESH supporters and affiliated media have continued to encourage lone actor attacks, vowing revenge for Adnani's death.

- While Adnani's replacement, Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir, is yet to specifically mention Canada,

10. **DAESH Strengthens Global Campaign for Inspired, Domestic, Lone Actor Attacks:** ITAC notes an ongoing shift in DAESH rhetoric since the last iteration of the NTTL, which has intensified the call on supporters and followers to instead join the 'virtual caliphate', by remaining in the West and carrying out domestic attacks on behalf of DAESH. Guidance on plotting and conducting a lone actor attack goes as far as to provide systematic steps to reduce the chances of detection by security agencies (such as employing ComSec measures and dressing in the style of a Westerner). DAESH also requests would-be attackers to send a pledge of allegiance via video, or affix a note to a victim or other such means, to enable DAESH to claim responsibility post-attack.

11. This Campaign for lone actor attacks continues to find traction amongst DAESH supporters

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DAESH's RUMIYAH Magazine

Arabic for "Rome". DAESH's latest multi-language (but non-Arabic) magazine has been published monthly since September 2016 by the Al-Hayat Media Centre, and appears to have replaced DAESH's Dabiq magazine. Rumiya more closely resembles AQAP's 'Inspire' publication in that it seeks to radicalize and influence readership to conduct small-scale terrorist attacks against the West.



14. **Shia extremist groups**, such as Hizballah, continue to pose a threat to Canada, although to a lesser extent than Sunni terrorist groups such as DAESH, AQ, and their affiliates.

Methods and Targeting

17. **Weapons of choice** appear to be dependant on whether the extremist has assistance and access to advanced weaponry (such as grenades, explosives and machine guns). Recent attacks indicate that multi-pronged attacks by IED, suicide bombing, and employing firearms are common for directed and coordinated cells of operatives, especially in Europe; whereas inspired lone actors – including Canadian extremists – use small arms, bladed weapons, or a vehicle.

ITAC 17/05-E

18. Recent propaganda by DAESH, AQ, and their affiliates continue to promote attack techniques of lower sophistication against the West and have provided specific advice and guidance on vehicular ramming and bladed weapon attacks, including the styles of knife deemed most effective, and where to attack an individual to exact the most harm. DAESH's 'Rumiyah' magazine has been running an article entitled 'Just Terror Tactics' that provides specific instructions and guidance on how to conduct an attack with a bladed weapon, firearm, and vehicle. See textbox entitled DAESH's Rumiyah Magazine for more information.
19. Online forums and Islamist propaganda are also encouraging the use of Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) in European countries.

ITAC notes that VBIED-specific capabilities amongst terrorist groups remain unrealized in Western countries (the September 4, gas-cylinder France-based attack was foiled by police).

20. Since the NTTL was raised to Medium in October 2014, complex attack capabilities, including those related to the use of chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) materials, have not been realized in Canada (Driver's plot is considered disrupted and therefore unrealized).

- the encouragement and guidance on attacks using simple weaponry is an attempt to increase the confidence and effectiveness of lone actors who would otherwise be less capable of conducting a terrorist attack.
- while domestic extremists may seek to conduct a copycat attack such as Driver's suicide-IED attempt, the primary terror-related threat to Canada is via lone actor with a bladed weapon, single firearm, or a vehicle.

Canadian Terror-Related Arrests in Canada: July-December 2016

2016 07 15 - ABDUL, Kadir (Toronto, ON) – Signed a peace bond forbidding him from associating or communicating with DAESH, Jabhat Fatah Al-Sham, or Samuel AVILES. ABDUL was arrested on 2016 04 15 upon returning from Turkey and charged with attempting to travel to an international conflict zone for the purpose of participating in a terrorist group.

2016 08 12 - GONYOU-MCLEAN, Tevis (Ottawa, ON) – Charged with uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm to "unspecified persons" while authorities sought a terrorism peace bond for his alleged support of DAESH. At the end of August, he was released on several conditions that forbade him from communicating with five people linked to terror-related activities in Ottawa, including twin brothers Ashton and Carlos LARMOND (mentioned below), Awso PESHADARY, Lugman ABDUNNUR and Carleton University student Eric TIBBETTS. While out on bail awaiting the outcome of his peace bond case, he was re-arrested on 2016 10 25 and charged with four counts of breach of recognizance.

2016 08 26 - LARMOND, Ashton (Ottawa, ON) – Considered the 'director' of Ottawa's cluster network. LARMOND was sentenced to 17 years for instructing a person to carry out a terrorist activity. Associated with twin brother Carlos LARMOND (mentioned below), Sulman MOHAMED (mentioned below), Awso PESHADARY (an Ottawa man who is awaiting trial on charges of facilitating and financing a homegrown terror network) and John MACQUIRE (an extremist linked to DAESH who, although reportedly killed in battle, was also charged with terrorism in absentia in 2015). He was arrested on 2015 01 09.

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2016 11 16 - ALDABOUS, Abdul (Toronto, ON) – Peace bond withdrawn on the grounds that ALDABOUS had reformed and no longer posed a security threat to Canada. ALDABOUS was arrested in September 2015 for his online activities that included communicating with DAESH members and domestic extremists such as Aaron DRIVER.

2016 12 08 - IBRAHIM, Khalid Ahmed (New Westminster, BC) – Arrested and released on a terrorism-related peace bond that includes 25 conditions. In July 2016, IBRAHIM was also charged with issuing threats.

2016 12 15 - EL SHAER, Mohammed (Mississauga, ON) – A peace bond was imposed with 17 conditions for traveling to an international conflict zone for the purpose of participating in a terrorist group. EL SHAER was charged with communicating with DAESH and attempting to travel to an international conflict zone for the purpose of participating in a terrorist group. He was arrested on 2016 12 15 and released on a peace bond that includes 17 conditions.

21. Public spaces and soft targets remain the primary target for attacks by both DAESH and those inspired by DAESH propaganda. Trending targets include football stadiums in Major European and Middle Eastern countries, bars and clubs, downtown areas, and public markets, including during the rush hour period. An increase in threat reporting during the holiday season against Christian-affiliated and public targets in Western countries also occurred this winter.
22. while the volume of threat reporting typically increases during any holiday season, does not guarantee an increase in attacks. Terrorists have, however, opportunistically sought to attack mass gatherings such as malls or open markets. The Berlin Christmas market attack on 2016 12 19 highlights such a threat.

24. Uniformed personnel such as military, security and law enforcement personnel have specifically been targeted by Islamist extremists both abroad and domestically, as made evident in successful domestic terrorist attacks and foiled attack plots over the past few years. Since the last iteration of the NTTL, calls for attacks against various uniformed personnel and their installations continue with regular frequency in extremist propaganda.

- while DAESH will accept an inspired attack against Western coalition countries regardless of the target's symbolic appeal, DAESH-core (as would AQ), still intends to direct more complex attack plots that focus on traditional symbolic targets. directed plots as being less likely to achieve success domestically due to the heightened difficulty in coordinating such attacks and the greater chance of detectability, in comparison with more opportunistic attacks that target public spaces and soft targets.
- domestic extremists are likely to continue to target Canadian uniformed personnel and related installations in neighbourhoods that are familiar to them (such as police stations and military recruitment centres).

25. **Canada's 150 Anniversary Events:** On 2016 12 31, Canada launched year-long celebrations to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Canadian Confederation. The October 2014 attack in Ottawa, the November 2015 attacks in Paris (which included the Stade de France stadium), and the July 2016 attack during the Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, France, are noted examples of directed and inspired attacks that targeted open-area sporting and special events. Such outdoor public events, which cover a large geographic area where large crowds move fluidly throughout, remain attractive targets for groups to amass large casualties in a very short period of time, and with relative ease.



On 2016 10 16, pro-DAESH al-Wa'd Foundation released two posters threatening future attacks in Canada: the first, depicting a DAESH operative and wolf watching the city of Toronto burn (above) stating "O worshipers of the cross in Canada, now now fighting came, our wolves will come to you from where you will not know so you won't enjoy life".

Source: SITE Intel Group

Cyber Threats and Technology

26. Extremists continue to take advantage of various technological advances such as message encryption applications (Telegram) and other platforms (the Dark Web) to prevent security agencies from accessing their online communications and propaganda dissemination. For example, in September 2016, a pro-DAESH hacker created a ZeroNet webpage, which functions as a serverless, peer-to-peer network crowdsourced by the BitTorrent network. On its own, ZeroNet does not provide anonymity but it can be configured to run through TOR.
27. Pro-DAESH groups continue to relay 'tips and tricks' and share security manuals and other attack-plot development information, such as kill lists, photos, maps, innovative attack ideas, and other details on potential targets to incite would-be attackers to wage jihad on behalf of DAESH. For example, on 2016 12 04, the United Cyber Caliphate's official Telegram channel released (in Arabic and English) contact information for thousands of small businesses, including some personal addresses of employees, for their "#BLACK_DAY_USA_BY_UCC" hashtag campaign. The list included 144 entries for Canada, including several in Greater Vancouver.

Terrorism Threat Levels for Canadian Transportation

29. Various jihadist propaganda and online materials continue to consider various transportation hubs as possible targets for attack, including all three transportation modes: rail, maritime and aviation. For example, in October 2016, a pro-jihad book was disseminated online that identified the economic and security-related impact of an attack on American and European seaports. The book details various American and European ports by importance and trading size, and advises on how to: take a ship hostage, equip a vessel with explosives, target another vessel for ramming or by missile, etc. and recommends an explosive laden-sea vessel, driven by suicide bombers, against targets including the Suez canal where Canadian flagged vessels are likely to port.

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY .
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY .

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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- AQ core and its affiliates continue to consider Canada and Canadian interests abroad a viable target for terrorist attacks.
 - any decrease in AQ 'brand power' amongst extremist networks and radicalized individuals has been tempered by AQ leadership who defends their position as the pre-imminent transnational Islamist jihadi group (owing to their supposed strict adherence to Quranic Sharia law) and reinforce a message that their top priority remains waging war against the U.S. and its allies.
15. **Shia extremist groups**, such as Hizballah, continue to pose a threat to Canada, although to a lesser extent than Sunni terrorist groups such as DAESH, AQ, and their affiliates.

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18. **Weapons of choice** appear to be dependant on whether the extremist has assistance and access to advanced weaponry (such as grenades, explosives and machine guns). Recent attacks indicate that multi-pronged attacks by IED, suicide bombing, and employing firearms are common for directed and coordinated cells of operatives, especially in Europe; whereas inspired lone actors - including Canadian extremists - use small arms, bladed weapons, or a vehicle.
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2016 08 26 - MOHAMED, Suliman (Toronto, ON) - Sentenced to seven years in prison for pleading guilty to conspiring with the LARMOND brothers and others to carry out terrorist activity. Associated with twin brothers Carlos and Ashton LARMOND (mentioned above). MOHAMED was arrested on 2015 01 12.

2016 10 12 - UDIN, Mohammad (Toronto, ON) - Sentenced to a conditional discharge for improperly disposing of a restricted assault-type rifle belonging to his son, Kadir ABDUL, the subject of a terrorism peace bond that requires him to stay away from DAESH. UDIN is also father to Malik ABDUL, a DAESH extremist who left Canada two years ago and is believed to have died in Syria.

2016 11 15 - ALDABOUS, Asad (Toronto, ON) - Peace bond withdrawn on the grounds that ALDABOUS had returned to his country of residence. ALDABOUS was arrested in September 2016 for his online activities that included communicating with DAESH members and other extremists such as Asad ALRIVER.

2016 12 06 - JORJAHM, Khalid Azman (New Westminster, BC) - Arrested and released on a terrorism-related peace bond that forbade him from communicating with others. JORJAHM was also charged with uttering threats.

2016 12 18 - EL SHAER, Muhammad (Toronto, ON) - A peace bond was imposed with 11 conditions for travel and communication.

21. Since the NTTL was raised to Medium in October 2014, complex attack capabilities, including those related to the use of chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) materials, have not been realized in Canada (Driver's plot is considered disrupted and therefore unrealized).
- the encouragement and guidance on attacks using simple weaponry is an attempt to increase the confidence and effectiveness of lone actors who would otherwise be less capable of conducting a terrorist attack.
 - while domestic extremists may seek to conduct a copycat attack such as Driver's suicide-IED attempt, the primary terror-related threat to Canada is via lone actor with a bladed weapon, single firearm, or a vehicle.
22. Public spaces and soft targets remain the primary target for attacks by both DAESH and those inspired by DAESH propaganda. Trending targets include football stadiums in Major European and Middle Eastern countries, bars and clubs, downtown areas, and public markets, including during the 'rush hour' period. An increase in threat reporting during the holiday season against Christian-affiliated and public targets in Western countries also occurred this winter.
23. while the volume of threat reporting typically increases during any holiday season, does not guarantee an increase in attacks. Terrorists have, however, opportunistically sought to attack mass gatherings such as malls or open markets. The Berlin Christmas market attack on 2016 12 19 highlights such a threat.

25. Uniformed personnel such as military, security and law enforcement personnel have specifically been targeted by Islamist extremists both abroad and domestically, as made evident in successful domestic terrorist attacks and foiled attack plots over the past few years. Since the last iteration of the NTTL calls for attacks against various uniformed personnel and their installations continue with regular frequency in extremist propaganda.

- while DAESH will accept an inspired attack against Western coalition countries regardless of the target's symbolic appeal, DAESH-core (as would AQ), still intends to direct more complex attack plots that focus on traditional symbolic targets. directed plots as being less likely to achieve success domestically due to the heightened difficulty in coordinating such attacks and the greater chance of detectability, in comparison with more opportunistic attacks that target public spaces and soft targets.

- domestic extremists are likely to continue to target Canadian uniformed personnel and related installations in neighbourhoods that are familiar to them (such as police stations and military recruitment centres).
26. Canada's 150 Anniversary Events: On 2016 12 31, Canada launched year-long celebrations to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Canadian Confederation. The October 2014 attack in Ottawa, the November 2015 attacks in Paris (which included the Stade de France stadium), and the July 2016 attack during the Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, France, are noted examples of directed and inspired attacks that targeted open-area sporting and special events. Such outdoor public events, which cover a large geographic area where large crowds move fluidly throughout, remain attractive targets for groups to amass large casualties in a very short period of time, and with relative ease.

Cyber Threats and Technology

27. Extremists continue to take advantage of various technological advances such as message encryption applications (Telegram) and other platforms (the Dark Web) to prevent security agencies from accessing their online communications and propaganda dissemination. For example, in September 2016, a pro-DAESH hacker created a ZeroNet webpage, which functions as a serverless, peer-to-peer network crowdsourced by the BitTorrent network. On its own, ZeroNet does not provide anonymity but it can be configured to run through TOR.
28. Pro-DAESH groups continue to relay 'tips and tricks' and share security manuals and other attack-plot development information, such as kill lists, photos, maps, innovative attack ideas, and other details on potential targets to incite would-be attackers to wage jihad on behalf of DAESH. For example, on 2016 12 04, the United Cyber Caliphate's official Telegram channel released (in Arabic and English) contact information for thousands of small businesses, including some personal addresses of employees, for their "#BLACK_DAY_USA_BY_UCC" hashtag campaign. The list included 144 entries for Canada, including several in Greater Vancouver.



On 2016 10 16, pro-DAESH al-Wa'd Foundation released two posters threatening future attacks in Canada: the first, depicting a DAESH operative and wolf watching the city of Toronto burn (above) stating "O worshipers of the cross in Canada, now now fighting came, our wolves will come to you from where you will not know so you won't enjoy life".

Source: SITE Intel Group

Terrorism Threat Levels for Canadian Transportation

30. Various jihadist propaganda and online materials continue to consider various transportation hubs as possible targets for attack, including all three transportation modes: rail, maritime and aviation. For example, in October 2016, a pro-jihad book was disseminated online that identified the economic and security-related impact of an attack on American and European seaports. The book details various American and European ports by importance and trading size, and advises on how to: take a ship hostage, equip a vessel with explosives, target another vessel for ramming or by missile, etc. and recommends an explosive laden-sea vessel, driven by suicide bombers, against targets including the Suez canal where Canadian flagged vessels are likely to port.

THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY .
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY .

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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THREAT HIGHLIGHT

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Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

CRITICAL INCIDENT

TH 17/12-Revised // 2017-01-30

Shooting at Quebec-city Mosque possibly motivated by hate

TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS
FOR **CANADA**
remains at MEDIUM

According to open sources, on 2017 01 29, Alexandre Bissonnette attacked the congregants of a mosque in Quebec City before fleeing the scene and subsequently turning himself in to police, apparently out of regret. Open sources also indicated that during the attack, which was initially labelled as a terrorist attack on Muslims, Bissonnette had an assault rifle (AK 47).

Bissonnette was not previously known to police.

According to open sources, Bissonnette's online presence has not been linked to Islamic extremism, rather, he has been revealed to follow a wide range of interests on social media. Some of Bissonnette's social media interests include the leader of France's National Front political party on whose support he has been vocal, and other Quebec-based nationalists.

Alexandre Bissonnette



Source: Facebook.com

In mid-2016, the same mosque was targeted in a hate incident. An unknown individual left a gift-wrapped pig's head on the stairs. In November-2015, a video began circulating online of a male stating that Muslims in Quebec would be killed soon. Although no one was arrested in connection with the pig's head, a Montreal-based man, was arrested in connection with the video.

On 2009 07 25, open sources reported on the funeral of a Canadian armed forces member based in Quebec City, who was killed by a landmine while serving in Afghanistan. During the funeral, a childhood friend named Alexandre Bissonnette "stood outside the church clutching a Canadian flag and a photo of [the soldier] in his army uniform."

ASSESSMENT NOTE

This assessment is based on open sources.

Terrorism Threat Level for Canada

Canada MEDIUM ↔

could occur.




ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism in Canada

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

	Threat levels:  raised  lowered  remains
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
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THREAT HIGHLIGHT

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Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

CRITICAL INCIDENT

THREAT // 2017-01-31

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Shooting at Quebec-city Mosque possibly motivated by hate

TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS
FOR **CANADA**
remains at MEDIUM

According to open sources, on 2017 01 29, Alexandre Bissonnette attacked the congregants of a mosque in Quebec City before fleeing the scene and subsequently turning himself in to police, apparently out of regret. Open sources also indicated that during the attack, which was initially labelled as a terrorist attack on Muslims, Bissonnette had an assault rifle (AK-47). A second person was also arrested at the scene but is now considered a witness rather than a suspect.

Bissonnette was not previously known to police. According to open sources, Bissonnette's online presence has not been linked to Islamic extremism, rather he has been revealed to follow a wide range of interests on social media. Some of Bissonnette's social media interests include the leader of France's National Front political party on whose support he has been vocal, and other Quebec-based nationalists.

In mid-2016, the same mosque was targeted in a hate incident. An unknown individual left a gift-wrapped pig's head on the stairs. In November-2015, a video began circulating online of a male stating that Muslims in Quebec would be killed soon. Although no one was arrested in connection with the pig's head, a Montreal-based man was arrested in connection with the video. No link has been made between either of these past incidents at the mosque and Bissonnette's attack.

On 2009 07 25, open sources reported on the funeral of a Canadian armed forces member based in Quebec City, who was killed by a landmine while serving in Afghanistan. During the funeral, a childhood friend named Alexandre Bissonnette, "stood outside the church clutching a Canadian flag and a photo of [the soldier] in his army uniform."

Alexandre Bissonnette



Source: Facebook.com

ASSESSMENT NOTE

based on open sources.

This assessment is

Terrorism Threat Level for Canada

Canada MEDIUM ↔

assesses that a violent act of terrorism in Canada could occur.

ITAC

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

THREAT LEVEL	DEFINITIONS
CRITICAL	Threat levels: ↑ raised ↓ lowered ↔ remains ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
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THREAT OF TERRORISM TO CANADA'S RAIL NETWORKS PASSENGER AND COMMERCIAL

This IAC threat assessment updates the terrorism threat levels to Canada's passenger and commercial rail network last published on 2015.11.17. The assessment examines the intent and capability of terrorist organizations or individuals to carry out attacks against Canada's rail network.



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The IAC threat assessment updates the terrorism threat levels to Canada's passenger and commercial rail network last published on 2015.11.17. The assessment examines the intent and capability of terrorist organizations or individuals to carry out attacks against Canada's rail network.

UNDETERMINED

SOPHISTICATED

- Attacks against passengers/crow
- Explosives
- Biological weapons
- Chemical weapons
- Infectious diseases
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- Poison gas attacks against passengers/crow
- Hijacking of trains
- Sabotage of rail infrastructure
- Use of rail infrastructure for terrorist activities
- Use of rail infrastructure for terrorist activities
- Use of rail infrastructure for terrorist activities

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VERY LOW

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VERY LOW

LOW:

HIGH

CRITICAL

DEFINITIONS

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ITM stresses that a violent act of terrorism is

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Intelligence Assessment
Évaluation du renseignement

CSIS IA 2016-17/43A

SECRET

2017 04 18

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada: a Preliminary Assessment

Key Assessments

Québec City Attack

On January 29, 2017, Alexandre Bissonnette, a 27-year-old resident of Québec City and student at the Université Laval, shot multiple attendees inside the Grande mosquée de Québec, located near his apartment.

His attack resulted in the deaths of six individuals and the wounding of 19 others. Bissonnette has been charged with six counts of first degree murder and five counts of attempted murder using a restricted weapon.

While open information suggests that he held extreme anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, anti-feminist and white-nationalist views,

Violent right-wing extremism: more than just hate

1. Right-wing extremism in Canada includes a complex range of groups and individuals espousing a broad range of issues and grievances, including white supremacy/white nationalism/white religion, anti-Semitism, homophobia, nativism/anti-immigration, anti-government/anti-law enforcement and racism. Within this range is a subset of groups which either overtly, or under the guise of non-violent, cultural or religious preservation, focus their on-line hate towards Islam, Muslim immigrants, multiculturalism and those Canadian politicians who are seen as supporting Muslim-friendly legislation.

2.

Historically, violence perpetrated by individuals holding extreme right-wing views has been infrequent,

Nevertheless, there are more than a thousand hate-driven incidents reported to police in Canada each year.

Hate crime in Canada

3. According to the most recent statistics produced by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS)¹, there were 1,295 cases of police-reported hate crimes in 2014 as compared to 1,165 in 2013 (representing an increase of 11.2%). Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver reported the highest number of incidents in 2013 and 2014. That said, the cities of Hamilton and Thunder Bay reported the highest number of incidents per 100,000 people, although the number of reported incidents for both cities decreased from 2013 to 2014 (from 95 to 82 and 25 to 16 incidents, respectively).¹

¹ The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS), in co-operation with the policing community, collects police-reported crime statistics through the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR). The UCR Survey was designed to measure the incidence of crime in Canadian society and its characteristics.

Defining Violent and Non-Violent Right-Wing Extremism

Extremism is not defined in Canada's *Criminal Code*. For the purpose of this assessment, extremism is defined as holding political, social, economic or religious views that propose far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order, while supporting non-criminal and sometimes criminal acts to achieve these aims. Violent extremism, therefore, can be defined as serious threats, harm, murder, mayhem and damage to property which are motivated and justified by extremist beliefs. At the heart of all right-wing extremism is hatred and fear. Only a very small number of people, however, act upon their extreme beliefs and engage in serious actions of violence or attempt to encourage others to do so.

Manifestation of Hate?

The Toronto Police Service identified an increase in the targeting of the Muslim community in November 2015 which it assessed could be attributed to negative backlash following the attacks in Paris, France, and the federal government's Syrian refugee resettlement plan.

4. In Québec City, the number of police-reported hate crimes increased from 19 in 2013 to 50 in 2014. On a per 100,000 population basis, incidents increased from 2.4 in 2013 (below the national average of 3.3) to 6.3 in 2014 (above the national average of 3.7).¹

While there has been an increase in the number of police-reported hate crimes nationally, the number of incidents per city varied, and in some cases decreased. Reported hate crimes in Montréal increased by 9.9% from 2013 to 2014 (and approximately 69% between 2013 and 2016). The Toronto Police Service experienced an 11.5% increase during the same period but witnessed a decline of approximately 8% from 2014 to 2015). Collectively, the majority of police-reported hate crimes were motivated by hatred of a religion (primarily Judaism and Islam) or ethnicity (Black, Arab/Southeast Asian).

Right-wing extremism in Canada

Right-wing extremism in Canada to 2006

6. Right-wing extremism and the resulting violence are not new in Canada. The country's first race riot occurred in Nova Scotia in 1784. Racial segregation was legalized in Ontario schools in 1849, and numerous acts of right-wing violence occurred against Chinese and Japanese immigrants to British Columbia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, not to mention the range of discriminatory legislation targeting Canada's Indigenous population.

7.

8. Despite attempts by the violent right-wing extremist milieu to capitalize upon the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and through the use of racist music and the Internet

¹ Neo-Nazis borrow elements from Nazi doctrine, including ultra-nationalism, racism, ableism, xenophobia, homophobia, anti-Semitism and imitating the Fourth Reich. Holocaust denial is a common feature, as is incorporation of Nazi symbols and admiration of Adolf Hitler. Racist skinheads may also be neo-Nazis but are more prone to extreme violence towards non-white immigrants as well as anti-racist activists and non-racist skinheads whom they consider traitors.

Right-wing extremism in Canada since 2006

Many of the groups identified in 2006 have disbanded

Despite these limitations, there have been numerous incidents of violence perpetrated by right-wing extremists since 2006.

10. There has been a significant growth of on-line groups (such as on Facebook) since 2006, focussing on a broad range of extreme right-wing positions including white supremacy.

**Anders Breivik
"The New Far Right"**

On July 22, 2011, Breivik detonated a car bomb in Oslo, Norway, killing eight people and critically injuring more than ten others. He subsequently travelled to the island of Utøya where he shot and killed 69 people at a youth camp run by the youth league of the Norwegian Labour Party.

Breivik explained his extreme right-wing views (anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism) in his 1,516-page manifesto.

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Anti-government, anti-police ideology

18.

subset which holds extreme anti-government, anti-law enforcement views. Often referred to in Canada as Freemen on the Land (FOTL), the ideology originated in the U.S. within the much more violent Sovereign Citizen Movement and is often linked to various U.S. militia groups. Generally speaking, Freemen regard government as a corporation, and an individual's relationship to it as contractual. Therefore, adherents to the ideology assert that they have the right to separate themselves from the government, or renegotiate their relationship with it. In order to become free, or sovereign, individuals submit a "claim of rights" to any recognized governmental authority of their choice. In their view, this act permits an individual to become "a human being" who lawfully revokes or denies consent to be represented and governed, and exists completely free of all statutory restraints.

19. This applies to almost all elements of their lives. For example, adherents deny the government (or the Crown) the authority to levy taxes, require driver's licenses or register weapons.

The Moncton Shooting

While the vast majority of FOTL adherents are non-violent, it should be noted that, in June 2014, Justin Bourque shot five RCMP officers, killing three and seriously wounding two. Bourque had previously espoused online a range of anti-law enforcement and other views shared by FOTL adherents.

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Right-wing extremism in Québec

21. Media reporting from January 22, 2017, suggests that hate crimes in Québec increased by almost 40% from 2013 to 2014, while the incidents of reported hate crimes in Montréal increased by approximately 69% from 2013 to 2016.

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Right-wing extremism in the United States and Western Europe

27.

According to the Extremist Crime Database, there were over 370 homicides committed by violent right-wing extremists in the U.S. from 1990–2010, claiming more than 600 lives.

Dylann Roof: The Modern Face of Domestic Terrorism?

According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Dylann Roof (the perpetrator of the 2015 Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church massacre) acted alone and was not a member of a racist hate group.

Instead, he appears to have been indoctrinated into the world of white nationalism online. In his 2,400-word manifesto, for example, he described becoming "racially aware" in the world of white supremacist websites following the controversy over the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012.

As he was murdering his victims, Roof told them that black people were "taking over our country" and "rap[ing] our women."

29. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center⁴, the number of hate groups in the U.S. reached a peak of 1,018 in 2011, followed by a steep decline to 784 by 2014.

30. In Europe, right-wing extremism is widespread, driven by unemployment, immigration, nativism, anti-Semitism and anti-Islamic sentiment. The last decade has seen the most visible cases featured in the media, including the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany, Anders Breivik's attacks in Norway, a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities in Hungary and Sweden, and the 2016 murder of British Labour Party politician Jo Cox by an ultra-nationalist. right-wing organizations in Europe are more openly affiliated with registered political parties. Far right political parties such as the Front National (France), Alternative für Deutschland (Germany), Party for Freedom (Netherlands), and Golden Dawn (Greece) promote policies which appeal to the broader right-wing extremist milieu. In Germany, for example, various fringe neo-Nazi groups continue to engage in serious acts of violence against visible minorities and recent immigrants/asylum seekers. Other extreme groups such as PEGIDA have attempted to capitalize on populist anger on a range of issues, including globalization, immigration and multiculturalism. In 2013, Germany's domestic security agency estimated that there were almost 22,000 far right extremists in the country,

⁴ The Southern Poverty Law Center is an American non-profit legal advocacy organization specializing in civil rights and public interest litigation

with roughly 10,000 considered potentially militant. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported 1,408 acts of far right violence in 2015, compared to 990 in 2014.

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THREAT HIGHLIGHT

ITAC CIET Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre



Canadian Security Intelligence

2017-02-10

SECRET

UPDATE: Quebec City mosque shooting


TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

remains at MEDIUM

Canadian Alexandre Bissonnette, a Quebec resident and University of Laval student, was responsible for carrying out a small-arms attack at the Grande mosque de Québec on 2017 01 29. According to media reporting on 2017 02 06, the RCMP described Bissonnette as a "criminal extremist". Bissonnette was charged with six counts of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder using a restricted firearm.

Since ITAC's initial assessment on 2017 01 30 (TH 17/12-Revised), open source reporting have provided some additional information. According to media reporting, Bissonnette called 911 after the attack to turn himself in.

Right-wing extremism in Canada



Source: Canadian Press

Canadian research published in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* in February 2016 found evidence that right-wing extremist groups are active in Canada, with concentrations in Quebec, western Ontario, Alberta and the lower mainland of British Columbia.

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ASSESSMENT NOTE

This assessment is based on

open sources.

DEFINITIONS and HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS are located at the last page

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CANADA

MEDIUM

ITAC

assesses that a violent act of terrorism in Canada could occur

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

THREAT LEVEL	DEFINITIONS
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY .
HIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY .
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR .
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY .
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY .

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

ITAC

CIET

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

TA 1704-E // 2017-06-19

SECRET

THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

VERY LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL

ITAC assesses
that a violent act of
terrorism could occur

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OBJECTIVES

1. This threat assessment updates the Canadian National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) last published on 2017 01 18 - ITAC 1704-E

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ASSESSMENT NOTE

This assessment is based on all-source information

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ATTACK ON THE GRANDE MOSQUEE DE QUEBEC



Source: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-city-mosque-alex.html

On 2017 01 29 Laval University student and Quebec City resident, Alexandre Bissonnette, entered the Grande Mosquée de Québec and opened fire on individuals attending prayers, killing 6 and wounding 19.

The full scope of Bissonnette's personal and/or political motive is not entirely clear, apart from his stated hatred of Muslims. Open information indicates that he holds views consistent with extreme right-wing ideology, e.g. anti-Muslim, anti-feminist, white nationalist.

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Methods

10. **Global Campaigns for Inspired, Domestic Attacks Continue:** Sunni extremist propaganda continues to call on Western-based supporters to 'become martyrs' and to conduct attacks in their homelands. DAESH continues to invest in its multilingual multi-platform campaign in an effort to grow its global support base, and similarly AQ is reinvigorating its own external communications efforts (See text box entitled AQ's 'Prince of Terror' on this page). In addition to traditional hard targets, supporters are encouraged to attack local, public spaces using readily available weapons, as seen in the June 2017 London Bridge and Borough Market attack in the UK. On 2017 06 06, the Nashir News Telegram channel affiliated with DAESH, published two statements warning the "crusaders" of more attacks to be carried out by "thousands of lonely [i.e. lone] lions." The channel called on Muslims living in the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, Canada, Belgium, Australia and Italy to avoid shopping centers, roads and parking areas, which it described as "targets for the soldiers of the Caliphate."

11. Canada continues to be named periodically in DAESH propaganda. Issue no. 9 of *Rumiyah* (DAESH's propaganda publication) recommends attacking soft targets such as night clubs, movie theatres, busy shopping malls, popular restaurants, concert halls, university campuses, public swimming pools and generally any busy, enclosed area, in order to maximize the potential for hostage-taking and mass casualty shootings. In February 2017, AQ's Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) released an English translation of a kidnapping guide, possibly written in late 2000 which details the benefit of and the tactics of kidnapping Westerners.

AQ'S 'PRINCE OF TERROR' THREATENS THE WEST AND CALLS FOR LONE ACTORS TO RISE UP

In his most recent audio-speech, Osama bin Laden's son, Hamza, popularly referred to as AQ's 'Prince of Terror', called upon 'martyrdom seekers' to attack in the West instead of immigrating to their battlefields, arguing that inflicting punishment on Jews and Crusaders where you are present is more vexing and severe for the enemy. The speech stressed the importance of publicly communicating a clear attack rationale and prioritized the following attack targets:

1. Those who transgress against Islam and its Prophet
2. Jewish interests
3. Americans
4. NATO member states' interests
5. Russia

Hamza states in his July 2016 audio-speech (entitled 'We are all Usama') that AQ has grown in strength and numbers and threatens revenge against the US and their allies over the next decade and a half, not just for killing his father but for what his death symbolized.

Hamza bin Laden was declared an international terrorist by the US State Department in January 2017, as he appears to be taking on more responsibilities within the group since being admitted to AQ's leadership in mid-2015.

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THREAT LEVEL // DEFINITIONS

Threat levels: ↑ raised ↓ lowered ↔ remains

CRITICAL

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **HIGHLY LIKELY** and **COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY**.

HIGH

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **LIKELY**.

MEDIUM

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism **COULD OCCUR**.

LOW

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY**.

VERY LOW

ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY**.

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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